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U.S. Supreme Court Says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Roads

Posted by Jeffrey Phillips | Jul 21, 2015 |

U.S. SUPREME COURT AND OTHER HIGH COURT CITATIONS PROVING THAT NO LICENSE IS NECESSARY FOR NORMAL USE OF AN AUTOMOBILE ON COMMON WAYS

“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guaranty one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.”

Thompson v.Smith, 154 SE 579, 11 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, section 329, page 1135 “The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business.” –

Thompson vs. Smith, supra.; Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784 “… the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference… is a fundamental constitutional right” -White, 97 Cal.App.3d.141, 158 Cal.Rptr. 562, 566-67 (1979) “citizens have a right to drive upon the public streets of the District of Columbia or any other city absent a constitutionally sound reason for limiting their access.”

Caneisha Mills v. D.C. 2009 “The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the RIGHT to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the Constitutional guarantees. . .”

Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 139 A2d 869, 872, See also: Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963). “The right to operate a motor vehicle [an automobile] upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.”

Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48; 91 Idaho 99 (1966). “A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy the public highways with other vehicles in common use.”

Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41. “The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway,* * * A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle.”

Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236. “The RIGHT of the citizen to DRIVE on the public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT which must be protected by the courts.” People v. Horton 14 Cal. App. 3rd 667 (1971) “The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle.”

House v. Cramer, 112 N.W. 3; 134 Iowa 374; Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co. 57 So. 233, 237, 62 Fla. 166. “The automobile may be used with safety to others users of the highway, and in its proper use upon the highways there is an equal right with the users of other vehicles properly upon the highways. The law recognizes such right of use upon general principles.

Brinkman v Pacholike, 84 N.E. 762, 764, 41 Ind. App. 662, 666. “The law does not denounce motor carriages, as such, on public ways. They have an equal right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads. It is improper to say that the driver of the horse has rights in the roads superior to the driver of the automobile. Both have the right to use the easement.”

Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 468. U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 2 2 “A highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or with any kind of vehicle.” Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 129 S.E. 861, 867, 161 Ga. 148, 159;

Holland v. Shackelford, 137 S.E. 2d 298, 304, 220 Ga. 104; Stavola v. Palmer, 73 A.2d 831, 838, 136 Conn. 670 “There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets of cities, or highways in the rural districts.” Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456 “The word ‘automobile’ connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways.”

-American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200 Motor Vehicle: 18 USC Part 1 Chapter 2 section 31 definitions: “(6) Motor vehicle. – The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways…” 10) The term “used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit. “A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received.”

-International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P. 120 The term ‘motor vehicle’ is different and broader than the word ‘automobile.’”

-City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232 “Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled” – Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20 ”

The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of.”

Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907). “…a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon…” State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171; Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256; Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516, Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982;

Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82 “The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived.”

Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22; Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934; Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607; 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163 “the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business… is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all.” –

Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781 “Every Citizen has an unalienable RIGHT to make use of the public highways of the state; every Citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty.” People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210. “No State government entity has the power to allow or deny passage on the highways, byways, nor waterways… transporting his vehicles and personal property for either recreation or business, but by being subject only to local regulation i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc. Travel is not a privilege requiring licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurances.”

Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22. “Traffic infractions are not a crime.” People v. Battle “Persons faced with an unconstitutional licensing law which purports to require a license as a prerequisite to exercise of right… may ignore the law and engage with impunity in exercise of such right.”

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969). U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 3 “The word ‘operator’ shall not include any person who solely transports his own property and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation.”

Statutes at Large California Chapter 412 p.83 “Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have the right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner; the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen.” Escobedo v. State 35 C2d 870 in 8 Cal Jur 3d p.27 “RIGHT — A legal RIGHT, a constitutional RIGHT means a RIGHT protected by the law, by the constitution, but government does not create the idea of RIGHT or original RIGHTS; it acknowledges them. . . “ Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1914, p. 2961. “Those who have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they already have right to do as such license would be meaningless.”

City of Chicago v Collins 51 NE 907, 910. “A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent.” Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39; 69 Cal. A. 2d 639. “The object of a license is to confer a right or power, which does not exist without it.”

Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273. “The court makes it clear that a license relates to qualifications to engage in profession, business, trade or calling; thus, when merely traveling without compensation or profit, outside of business enterprise or adventure with the corporate state, no license is required of the natural individual traveling for personal business, pleasure and transportation.”

Wingfield v. Fielder 2d Ca. 3d 213 (1972). “If [state] officials construe a vague statute unconstitutionally, the citizen may take them at their word, and act on the assumption that the statute is void.” –

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969). “With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority.” Donnolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O’Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887. “The right to travel (called the right of free ingress to other states, and egress from them) is so fundamental that it appears in the Articles of Confederation, which governed our society before the Constitution.”

(Paul v. Virginia). “[T]he right to travel freely from State to State … is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association, it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.” (U.S. Supreme Court,

Shapiro v. Thompson). EDGERTON, Chief Judge: “Iron curtains have no place in a free world. …’Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Constitution.’

Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186. “Our nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.” Id., at 197.

Kent vs. Dulles see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 6, 13—14. “The validity of restrictions on the freedom of movement of particular individuals, both substantively and procedurally, is precisely the sort of matter that is the peculiar domain of the courts.” Comment, 61 Yale L.J. at page 187. “a person detained for an investigatory stop can be questioned but is “not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.”Justice White, Hiibel “Automobiles have the right to use the highways of the State on an equal footing with other vehicles.”

Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co. v Yeiser 141 Kentucy 15. “Each citizen has the absolute right to choose for himself the mode of conveyance he desires, whether it be by wagon or carriage, by horse, motor or electric car, or by bicycle, or astride of a horse, subject to the sole condition that he will observe all those requirements that are known as the law of the road.”

Swift v City of Topeka, 43 U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 4 Kansas 671, 674. The Supreme Court said in U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a “statute.” A traveler on foot has the same right to use of the public highway as an automobile or any other vehicle.

Cecchi v. Lindsay, 75 Atl. 376, 377, 1 Boyce (Del.) 185. Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages.

Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 205; See also: Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 202 Ill. 66; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 28-29. …automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highways with horses and carriages. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354.

Matson v. Dawson, 178 N.W. 2d 588, 591. A farmer has the same right to the use of the highways of the state, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, as any other citizen.

Draffin v. Massey, 92 S.E.2d 38, 42. Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles. Doherty v. Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 197 Mass. 241, 246;

Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 486; Smiley v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 157, 158. “A soldier’s personal automobile is part of his ‘household goods[.]’

U.S. v Bomar, C.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235” 19A Words and Phrases – Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94. “[I]t is a jury question whether … an automobile … is a motor vehicle[.]”

United States v Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1983). Other right to use an automobile cases: –

EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160 –

TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78 – WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274 – CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT 43-44 – THE PASSENGER CASES, 7 HOWARD 287, AT 492 – U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758 (1966) –

GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, AT 105-106 (1971) – CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4, note 6 –

SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) – CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170, AT 176 (1978) Look the above citations up in American Jurisprudence. Some citations may be paraphrased.

This article first appeared on SomeNextLevelShit.com and was authored by Jeffrey Phillips.

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Right To Travel, California Case Win

Charles Sprinkler   http://www.landrights.com/The%20Charles%20Sprinkler%20File.htm 1. 1273 Rice Road #48 Ojai CA 93023 In Pro Per  (( It is reported that Sprinkler has deceased , after traveling for 35 years with no plates or operators license in California, Google, and Youtube him you will find it interesting.)) (Title 18 USC Law Suit) This motion is posted at www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/5686.html and www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/5686.pdf Lawyerdude’s most important page. His top 10 lists: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5459.html Telephone Lawyerdude: 805 652 0334 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 805 652 0334 end_of_the_skype_highlighting Back to Lawyerdude’s discussion group: www.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawyerdude Email lawyerdude: [email protected] The Steve 762 program to fight traffic tickets: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5695.html Combined Superior and Municipal Court of California 800 S. Victoria, Ventura CA 93003 >>> People

Charles Sprinkler

Case # 2002: 013, 441

Document #5686

Notice of 995 Motion.

Declaration of Defendant re Court’s 1 month delay in producing tapes.

Demand for continuance prior to arraignment to permit me to appeal the denial of 1638.5 motion if necessary.

Proof of Service

Date:  10 April 2003. Thursday.

Place:  Court 14.

Time:  9 a.m.

Notice of PC 995 Motion.

To District Attorney Greg Totten and his employees: Be advised that at the venue indicated or at such other venue as the court shall prescribe the defendant will ask that the complaint be set aside pursuant to the provisions of PC 995.

____________________ Defendant. February 14, 2003

Sign on side of Gramps truck: “Not for Hire”

“Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment.” -Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147

“Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion — to go where and when one pleases — only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.” [emphasis added] American Jurisprudence 1st. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p 1135.

Motion to Set Aside Pursuant to PC 995

Table of Contents. The purple words are live links:

Tables of Authorities cited herein:

Table #1 U.S. Supreme Court cases cited herein:

Table #2: Lower Federal Court Cases cited herein:

Table #3 California Cases cited herein.

Table #4: Cases from other states cited herein:

Table #5: Pennsylvania statutes and rules cited herein:

Table #6: Constitutional clauses cited herein:

Table #7: Learned Treatises and Encyclopedias cited herein:

Memorandum of Authorities

History of the driver license

In the Beginning we built roads. We shared common tenancy.

Declaration of Douglas Palaschak re: The law of licensure of farm trucks.

Defendant did not suddenly lose his right to drive.

We use the road as common tenants – not as renters from the state

Comparison of Tenant in Common to Licensee

The Nature of a License: permission to do something that one otherwise may not do.

Supreme Court’s Views on the right to Locomotion

The Department of Motor Vehicles has by stealthy encroachment overstepped its bounds

Supreme Court’s older Traditional View of Right to Travel

States may not compact with each other without permission of Congress.

Some cases that flesh out the difference between “rights” and “privileges”

Liberties may not be licensed – although by stealthy encroachment that was the trend

The Constitutional Right to Travel. Locomotion. Association.

General Ancient Libertarian Premise

Right to Use Roads and Highways.

The Common Law Right to Travel

Automobiles and the Right to Travel.

Defendant is not required to have a driver license.

There is no compelling state interest

Some would say that the right to travel is limited to travel without a car. They are wrong.

Licensing distinguished from mere Regulation

The California Constitution contains no grant of power to take away our right to use the road – and such a grant would violate the privileges and immunities clause.

Abrogation of the Right of Property by stealthy encroachment

Conclusions applicable to Defendant’s use of the roads in common tenancy

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964 1

Boyd v. United States (1886) 1

Gibbons v. Ogden (Feb 1824) 22 US 1, 6 L Ed 23, 9 Wheat 1. Steamboat licensing dispute. 1

Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) 1

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) 1

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) 1

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) 1

U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a “statute.” 1

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) 1

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) 1

Douglas v City of Jeannette 130 F 2nd 652, 655. 1

Knoll Golf Club v U.S., 179 F Supp 377 1

Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 222 Pac. 2d 1, 5, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950). The losing side made all the correct arguments in this case. 1

Beard v City of Atlanta (__) 86 SE 2nd 672, 676; 91 Ga. App. 584. 1

Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221. “The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived.” 1

City of Louisville v Sebree (19__) 214 SW 2nd 248, 308 Ky 420 1

Littleton v Burgess 82 P 864, 866, 14 Wyo 173. 1

Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273. 1

Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147 “Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment.”. 1 2

Taylor v Smith, 140 Va. 217, 235 1

Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579. 1

Wool v Larner, 26 A 2nd 89, 92, 112 Vt. 431. 1

California Constitution 1

Edwards v California. 1

equal protection 1

Equal Protection Clause 1

U.S. Constitution: Art. 1 Section 10, Clause 3: “ No state shall, without Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. . . 1

U.S. v Guest 1

American Jurisprudence, 1st Edition. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135 “The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.” 1

The townships generally required citizens to contribute approximately 10 days in the spring to fix the roads. Those citizens with wagons hauled macadam rock and other materials.

Evolution of Driver License – as related by Charles Sprinkle of Ojai, California

Charles was born in 1939 in West Virginia. He says that volunteers patrolled the roads carrying gasoline for people with car problems. Eventually every driver paid 25 cents toward the gasoline fund. The receipt for this 25 cents was your license to use the road and partake of the services should you become stranded.

I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury: I remember. I was raised on a grand corn and soybean farm in Illinois. When I was age 9, each of my Grandfathers owned a grain truck. Both trucks said the same thing on the side: “Not for hire”. I pondered this strange message for many years. Why would you not hire your truck out? Why make an issue of it before anybody even asks? The answer seemed to be that if you hired out your truck then you became subject to a higher tax on the truck. In fact to this day there is a rule, perhaps unwritten, that a farmer may drive his truck to the nearest grain elevator just as he may drive his tractor and wagon, to wit: without regard for licenses on the driver or the truck – because none are needed for the tractor and wagon hauling corn in from the field.

I drove a grain truck again on the farm in the harvests of 1996, 1997, and 1998. I drove it without a driver license for a truck, and, as I recall, the trucks, or at least one of them was not currently registered. That is how the issue arose.

________________

Douglas Palaschak

By stealthy encroachment the state takes away our liberty and sells is back to us as a license. The stealth encroachment process of the corporation/ state against the human depends on time for its success. The human lives perhaps 85 years. The corporation/ state has eternal life. As each succeeding generation dies off, the next generation fails to remember the lessons and history of the previous generation. The corporation state counts on that. Defendant remembers the way it was.

Stealthy encroachment at work: The state counts on this generation to forget that we use the roads as tenants in common – not as licensees! Teodor Marian and his Mentor Richard McDonald have researched this vein. By looking back at old disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other ways of passage, we see clearly that the view was that public property is nothing more than property held in common tenancy for use by the public.

The licensee must request the license from the licensor, he cannot demand it from him. The licensor cannot require the licensee to take his license under the licensee has encroached upon the thing or act that the licensor has competent authority over. You cannot demand a liquor license. By comparison you can use the road without even demanding anything. It is there to be used by all.

You may not hunt pheasant in my corn field without my permission. However, we each have the right, barring abuse, to use the road. We are tenants on common on the road.

To license means to confer on a person the right to do something which otherwise he would not have the right to do. City of Louisville v Sebree (19__) 214 SW 2nd 248, 308 Ky 420

The state cannot sell a right to drive; it was already ours.

The object of a license is to confer a right or power, which does not exist without it. Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273.

The word “license” means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. Gibbons v. Ogden (Feb 1824) 22 US 1, 6 L Ed 23, 9 Wheat 1.

Supreme Court’s Views on the right to Locomotion

A good place to start is Edwards v California (1941) 314 U.S. 160. The court held that a state may not condition interstate travel upon wealth.  Edwards v California (1941)The facts of this case are simple and are not disputed. Appellant isa citizen of the United States and a resident of California. In December, 1939, he left his home inMarysville, California, for Spur, Texas, with the intention of bringing back to Marysville, his wife’s brother,Frank Duncan, a citizen of the United States and a resident of Texas. [314 U.S. 160, 171] When hearrived in Texas, appellant learned that Duncan had last been employed by the Works ProgressAdministration. Appellant thus became aware of the fact that Duncan was an indigent person and hecontinued to be aware of it throughout the period involved in this case. The two men agreed that appellantshould transport Duncan from Texas to Marysville in appellant’s automobile. Accordingly, they left Spur onJanuary 1, 1940, entered California by way of Arizona on January 3, and reached Marysville on January 5.When he left Texas, Duncan had about $20. It had all been spent by the time he reached Marysville. Helived with appellant for about ten days until he obtained financial assistance from the Farm SecurityAdministration. During the ten day interval, he had no employment.

1. In Justice Court a complaint was filed against appellant under Section 2615 of the Welfare andInstitutions Code of California, St.1937, p. 1406, which provides: ‘Every person, firm or corporation, orofficer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not aresident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.’ On demurrer tothe complaint, appellant urged that the Section violated several provisions of the Federal Constitution. Thedemurrer was overruled, the cause was tried, appellant was convicted and sentenced to six monthsimprisonment in the county jail, and sentence was suspended. On appeal to U.S. Supreme Court,Edwards won.

Close Edwards v California (1941)The facts of this case are simple and are not disputed. Appellant isa citizen of the United States and a resident of California. In December, 1939, he left his home inMarysville, California, for Spur, Texas, with the intention of bringing back to Marysville, his wife’s brother,Frank Duncan, a citizen of the United States and a resident of Texas. [314 U.S. 160, 171] When hearrived in Texas, appellant learned that Duncan had last been employed by the Works ProgressAdministration. Appellant thus became aware of the fact that Duncan was an indigent person and hecontinued to be aware of it throughout the period involved in this case. The two men agreed that appellantshould transport Duncan from Texas to Marysville in appellant’s automobile. Accordingly, they left Spur onJanuary 1, 1940, entered California by way of Arizona on January 3, and reached Marysville on January 5.When he left Texas, Duncan had about $20. It had all been spent by the time he reached Marysville. Helived with appellant for about ten days until he obtained financial assistance from the Farm SecurityAdministration. During the ten day interval, he had no employment.

1. In Justice Court a complaint was filed against appellant under Section 2615 of the Welfare andInstitutions Code of California, St.1937, p. 1406, which provides: ‘Every person, firm or corporation, orofficer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not aresident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person , is guilty of a misdemeanor.’ On demurrer tothe complaint, appellant urged that the Section violated several provisions of the Federal Constitution. Thedemurrer was overruled, the cause was tried, appellant was convicted and sentenced to six monthsimprisonment in the county jail, and sentence was suspended. On appeal to U.S. Supreme Court,Edwards won.

Close . I contend that the driver license scheme is merely a regressive tax and therefore an impermissible barrier to interstate commerce. People are commerce. Interstate commerce includes, ironically, instate commerce, for purpose of this analysis.

There is a case that says that all administrative law is unconstitutional. We need not be that drastic. Certainly there are some things that the Department of Motor Vehicles can do lawfully. They can assist in transferring title of a car. They can administer a driver test. Even if the state legislature cooperates and passes a “statute” for the motor vehicle code, that “statute” is really more like a “regulation” in that even the legislature has no power to impede commerce absent compelling state interest.

The Supreme Court said in U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a “statute.” While in practical effect regulations may be called “little laws,” 1. 7 they are at most but offspring of statutes.” I cite this case only to point out that indeed there is a difference between regulations and statutes. Furthermore, not all laws are created equal. Furthermore, a statute that regulates without constitutional authority is a nullity even though it be published in the books, recognized by the police and lowers courts, and even though it be unchallenged for decades. Such is current state of driver license laws in these United States. We are in the age of government excess. Over half the working people work for some form of government. By manipulating the money, by imprisoning dissenters, by owning the bulk of the stock of public corporations, by deceptive bookkeeping, and by other oppression, fraud, and malice, the governments have lulled the populace into a belief in the presumed regularity of whatever the government says. Well, I am here to tell you it aint so!

Supreme Court’s older Traditional View of Right to Travel

Here is the Loyola Law School’s page on “Right to Travel”http://faculty.lls.edu/~manheimk/cl2/travelx.htm

Close Here is the Loyola Law School’s page on “Right to Travel”http://faculty.lls.edu/~manheimk/cl2/travelx.htm

“The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.

“The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived.” Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221.

“Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment.” Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147.

“Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion — to go where and when one pleases — only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.” American Jurisprudence 1st Edition, Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.

The leading cases regarding travel in general are:

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)

Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)

Consider the compact by which all states seem to want you to have a driver license from one state only.

U.S. Constitution: Art. 1 Section 10, Clause 3:  “No state shall, without Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. . .”

Some cases that flesh out the difference between “rights” and “privileges”

The permission or license is a special right or privilege. Once a license exists only the licensee has he right to do the thing the licensor allows. The licensee is privileged over others who do not have a license. It thus is a privilege to have the right to do the thing that is licensed. In other words, the right or permission granted by the licensor is a privilege since he controls who can and who cannot exercise the right. If the licensor grants the licensee a right or benefit, it is called a privilege:

The word privilege is defined as a peculiar benefit, favor, or advantage, a right or immunity not enjoyed by all, or it may be enjoyed only under special conditions. Knoll Golf Club v U.S., 179 F Supp 377

Since the right or permission to do a thing is called a license, and since the right is “peculiar” to the licensee alone, the license is called a privilege. Anything that requires a license is a privilege.

A license for the sale of intoxicating liquor is a privilege. Chiordi v Jernigan 129 P 2nd 640, 642; 46 NM 396.

Even privileges must be administered even-handedly. Authority: Equal Protection Clause.

Also, grandfather clauses, and implied clauses, forbid the state to take away a vested right.

Those have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they already have right to do as such license would be meaningless. City of Chicago v Collins (19__) 51 NE 907, 910.

Also, those things which are considered as inalienable rights , which all Americans possess, cannot be licensed since those are not held to be a privilege.

The right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religious worship are not privileges. Douglas v City of Jeannette 130 F 2nd 652, 655.

A license bypasses a legal barrier or makes an otherwise unlawful act lawful. The nature of a license allows the licensee to do something he could not otherwise legally do. Thus, a license gives the licensee the right to do something that would otherwise be illegal or unlawful for him to do.

A license is a mere permit to do something that without it would be unlawful. Littleton v Burgess, 82 P 864, 866, 14 Wyo 173.

A license is a right granted by some competent authority to do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. Beard v City of Atlanta (__) 86 SE 2nd 672, 676; 91 Ga. App. 584.

A licensee is one privileged to enter or remain on land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or permission. Wool v Larner, 26 A 2nd 89, 92, 112 Vt. 431.

The licensor has the power to prohibit. Since the licensor is in the position to grant a right or permission it logically follows that he has the power to prohibit the act also. Likewise, having the power to prohibit something from being done, it follows as a corollary that power also exists to permit its use. Taylor v Smith, 140 Va. 217, 235. Thus, where the power to license exists so does he power to prohibit.

The authority to license implies the power to prohibit, such being the meaning of the term. The City of Burllington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa 673, 674.

The power to license necessarily includes the power to inhibit unlicensed persons from doing the acts authorized by license. The power to refuse license necessarily gives the power to limit the issuance of licenses. Ex parte M.T. Dickey, 76 W. Va.576, 585; 85 SE 781.

A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39; 69 Cal. A. 2d 639.

Since the Motor Vehicles Departments, i.e., licensors, the Motor Vehicles Department(s) can issue or refuse to issue a license and thereby permit or prohibit anyone from exercising the right or privilege they has authority over.

A license carries limitations, restrictions and requirements. Whenever a license is issued the licensee is under certain limitations and requirements established by the Motor Vehicles Department (licensor), which may be implied or expressed when the license was issued. These limitations and requirements are often in the form of rules and regulations and may be referred to as the “terms” of the license, which the licensee is subject to. The following decision reveals these characteristics:

“Licensee,” as used in Pub. St. c. 100, in reference to certain licensees, and providing that no such licensee shall place or maintain any screen, curtain, or other obstruction on the licensed premises, refers to every licensee, and not merely such as have been required by the licensing board to remove a screen, curtain, or other obstruction. Commonwealth v. Rourke, 6 N.E. 383, 384; 141Mass. 321.

Those that are licensed under the statute cited above are restricted in their ability to erect curtains, screens, or other obstructions on their premises due to the terms of the license. It matters not where these terms were directly stated to the licensee or stated in the rules and regulations that cover such licensed businesses, the licensee still becomes subject to the terms of the license. There can be no argument that such terms are unreasonable as the licensor is in authority to make any such rules.

If a city chooses to grant permission [a license] to individuals to conduct a taxicab business in its streets, it can prescribe such terms and conditions as it may see fit, and individuals desiring to avail themselves of such terms and conditions, whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. Eason v. Dowdy, 219 Ga. 555.

Also, any argument that such terms are in violation of one’s rights has no legal standing. When person(s) takes a license, he in effect must waive any rights that would otherwise conflict with the terms of the license. The licensor has the authority over the thing being licensed therefore his term must prevail over the rights of the licensee and out of respect of the licensor’s right to control the thing or act. Thus, the rights of the licensee are limited by the terms of the license.

The rights of a licensee can rise no higher than the terms of the statute or ordinance by which he became the holder. Steves et al. v Robie, 139 Me. 359, 363.

The licensee must submit to the rules, limitations, and requirements the licensor sets out as the terms of the license.

A license is revocable by the licensor. When a license exists, it is within the power of the Motor Vehicles Department(s) (licensor) to revoke the license at any time this entity wishes.

Permits to carry on a liquor business issued under Liquor Control Act are mere licenses revocable as provided in such act. State v. Hawlew, 44 N.E. 2d 815, 820.

A license, pure and simple, is a mere personal privilege, and it is revocable at law, at the pleasure of the licensor, even when money has been paid for it. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 133 A. 2d 373, 385; 45 N.J. Super. 445.

A license is one to whom an owner of realty has granted a mere right of occupancy, and such license is revocable at the option of the licensor. Caldwell v. Mitchell, 158 NYS 2d 868, 870.

The licensee cannot possibly revoke the license he is the holder of since he did not give himself the permission or license in the first place. Only the licensor can revoke a license.

The terms and rules of a license are amendable. Restrictions, limitations, and requirements can be added, deleting or modified at a future date and become new terms of the license. Here again only the licensor is able to amend the terms and conditions of the license. Thus, when the licensor makes a requirement after the license is issued, the licensee is subject to that requirement just as though it were an original condition of the license.

The foregoing characteristics of a license reveal the legal principles that potentially exist whenever licensing takes place.

A license is often found under the law of contracts and apparently shares some attributes of contract. However, in its truest sense, a license is not a contract and it has generally been so held.

A license is merely a privilege to do business and is not a contract between authority granting it and grantee nor is it a property right, nor does it create a vested right. Mayo v. Market Fruit Co. of Sanford, Fla.,40 So. 2d 555, 559.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal granting it and the person to whom it is granted, and is not property or a property right. American States Water Services Co. of California v Johnson, 88 P.2d 770, 774; 31 Cal. App. 2d 606.

A license requires that one of the parties have competent authority over the thing or the act involved in the agreement whereas a contract does not. A license can be terminated by one of the parties at any time but a contract cannot. These authorities also show that a license is not property right because it is not in itself property. Neither is a license a vested right but only a privilege.

The Undersigned now brings to light in what manner can a license be used when controlling the acts of individuals that are regarded as “natural rights”, or in exercising [3] “constitutional rights”.

The terms liberty and license are often viewed as two different things. Liberty being a sacred right everyone has, and a license being a grant that is often assigned and documented by way of a piece of paper. This is true where we use these words as if they are commonly understood.

Liberty is viewed as an inherent and inalienable right, and one all free men naturally possess. This is to be distinguished from the type of right given by an individual or government, which is commonly called a license. Thus, the latter is not, and cannot be, considered as a substitute for the former.

However, the technical and legal definition of these two words is actually synonymous.

A license gives one the right or “liberty” to do a certain thing.

Definition: “License”: Leave; permission; authority or liberty given to do or forbear any act. A license may be verbal or written; when written, the paper containing the authority is called a license. A man is not permitted to retail spirituous liquors till he has obtained a license. Webster’s American Dictionary, 1828.

It can be seen by this definition that a license is a liberty. Once one has a “license” one has “liberty” or is at liberty to do something.

U.S. v Guest

Edwards v California.

The basis of the RIGHT TO TRAVEL primarily centers around the peoples inalienable and natural right of “liberty”. At times, both “The State” and the U.S. Constitution recognize liberty.

Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our Constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion – to go where one pleases, and when, and to do what may lead to one’s business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.

One may travel along the public highways or in public places. *** These are rights which existed long before our [their Federal] Constitution, and we have taken just pride in their maintenance, making them a part of the fundamental law of the land. Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584, 44 N.W. 579 (1889).

There now exists policies/laws that attempt to prohibit travel in the several states that attempt to prohibit travel by way of “driver’s licenses” and taxes, along with other quasi-State laws.

The two rights of liberty and property which are taken for granted, are extremely important rights and when claimed and asserted should not be taken lightly by the courts.

This court has consistently held to the view that liberty of the person and the right to the control of one’s own property are very sacred rights which should not be taken away or withheld except for very urgent reasons. In re Guardianship of Collition, 164 N.W. 2d 480, 483; 41Wis. 2d 487 (1969).

Since the Governors Convention on March 6, 1933 and the bankruptcy of this Nation by the infamous Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 9, 1933, the States have come increasingly more and more aggressive in controlling the people and their property, and these States will now not tolerate anyone traveling in their domain without their permission, i.e. license. Just a short time after this bankruptcy, on April 21, 1933, the license law was passed , but not enforced….?

When government passes an unlawful act, such as the licensing of a right, people need to know they have no obligation to obey it, for it is void from the time it was enacted:

An unconstitutional legislative enactment, through law in form, is in fact not law at all. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 442.

Where the people remain ignorant of the law, they will be in bondage. Quoting Thomas Jefferson: “If a people expects to be ignorant and free, they expect what never was and never will be.” The following maxim was often cited in early America to guard against this problem:

That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles. See, Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442.

Defendant claims all God given Natural Rights and asserts these inherited rights that are unalienable reinforced in “ The Declaration of Independence ” (1776), where the defendant does not descend from, here, now, and in the future, knowingly or unknowingly.

Status, and Alliance of Administrators of this Legislative Tribunal/Court:

The acting members/officers doing business in this instant matter have taken an “Oath of Office,” an alliance, The Constitution for the United States of America, Preamble (1787). Thus, it is these instruments (along with social and moral obligations) that are first and foremost duty to uphold. Therefore the Defendant will hold these representatives/officers/employees/trustees to their Oaths and/or alliances].

One of the rights involved in this matter is liberty, the liberty belonging to Defendant, which are fundamental and inalienable rights. They cannot be destroyed or diminished by legislative acts, or failure to act.

Those acting in government cannot override constitutional law, i.e. The Bill of Rights , at defiance by lightly passing over the peoples rights to liberty which is so deeply imbedded in God given Rights and your constitutions.

The right of liberty encapsulates the right of locomotion or travel is basic and obvious. The establishment and understanding of this liberty, as it applies to the defendant, is of paramount importance in making a decision in this matter. The “Liberty” claimed here includes the Aright to travel.” This “ Right to Travel” , however, is not created by the Constitution but rather by the Union , which your alliance to the Constitution protects.

The first issue that must be established is what is the nature of a public road or highway, and what are the rights of the defendant thereon. All of your authorities agree that the use of roadways for ordinary travel is a basic and fundamental right:

A highway is a way over which the public have a free right of passage. Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610; 134 Atl. 268, 271.

The essential features of a highway is that it is a way over which the public at large has he right to pass. State v. Pierson, 2 Conn. Cir. 660; 204 A.2d 838.

This right pf the people is in the street and highways of the state, whether inside or outside the municipalities thereof, is a paramount right . Light & Coke v. City of Chicago, N.E.2d 777, 781; 413 Ill. 457 (1952).

It is well settled that the public are entitled to a free passage along the highway. Michelson v. Dwyer, 63 N.W.2d 513, 517; 158 Neb. 427 (1954).

Our society is built in part upon free passage of men and goods, and the public streets and highways may rightfully be used for travel by everyone. Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 383.

Public ways, as applied to ways by land, are usually termed “highways” or “public roads”, are such ways as every citizen has a right to use. Kripp v. Curtis, 11 P. 879; 71 Cal. 62

A highway includes all public ways which the public generally has a right to use for passage and traffic, and includes streets in cities, sidewalks, turnpikes and bridges. Central Ill. Coal Mining Co. v. Illinois Power Co., 249 Ill. App.199.

Our courts has stressed he basic right of the transient public and abutting property owners to the free passage of vehicles on public highways and the paramount function of travel as overriding all other subordinate uses of our streets. State v. Perry, 269 Minn. 204, 206

A highway is a public road, which every citizen of the state has a right to use for the purpose of travel. Shelby County Com v. Castetter, 33 N.E. 986, 987, 7 Ind. App. 309; Spindler v. Toomey, 111 N.E/2d 715, 716 (Ind.-1963).

The public have a right of free and unobstructed transit over streets, sidewalks and alleys, and this is the primary appropriate use to which they are generally dedicated. Pugh v. City, 176 Iowa 593, 599, 156 N.W. 892, 894.

It is well settled law that every member of the public has a right to use the public roads in a reasonable manner for the promotion of his health and happiness. Sumner v. County v. Interurban Transp. Co., 141 Tenn. 493 500.

A highway is a road or way upon which all persons have a right to travel at pleasure. It is the right of all persons to travel upon a road. Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v Adkinson, 77 So. 954, 955; 117 Miss. 118.

HIGHWAY.-A free and public road, way, or street; one which every person has the right to use. Black’s Law Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1910), p. 571

The right to travel over a street or highway is a primary absolute right of everyone. Foster’s Inc. v. Boise City, 118 P.2d 721, 728

A right is a passage, road or street which every citizen has a right to use. Ohio, Indiana, & W. Ry. Co. v. People, 39 Ill. App. 473.

Highways are public roads, which every citizen has a right to use. Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455, 458; 13 Am. Rep. 399.

The courts of this land have repeatedly and consistently concurred on the fact that the people have a right to travel on the public roads and highways of this country. But the nature of this right must be determined. What type of right is it questioned here? It is only a statutory right or an inherent right ? The cases cited indicate that it is a fundamental, inalienable, inherent and constitutional right. Other authorities verify this to be true:

It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen of the state. Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, 224 Pac. 1008, 1013 (1924); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 222 Pac. 2d 1, 5, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950).

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va.-1930).

This right of the people to the use of the public streets of a city is so well established and so universally recognized in this country, that it has become a part of the alphabet of fundamental rights of the citizen. Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 Pac. 1075,1076, 43 Kansas 671, 674.

The right of a citizen to use the highways, include the streets of the city or town, for travel and to transport his goods, is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him. Florida Motor Lines v. Ward, 137 So. 163, 167. Also: State v. Quigg, 114 So. 859, 862 (Fla.-1927); Davis v. City of Houston, 264 S.W. 625, 629 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924).

The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under law. Shactman v Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (1955)

The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but, a common right.@ See Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579.

“All citizens of the United States of America have a right to pass and re-pass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in their own state.” See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 12 L Ed. 702.

Every citizen has an inalienable right to make use of the public highways of the state; every citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty. People v Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180, 182 (Colo.-1961).

Definition of “Passenger: “One who is traveling, as in a public coach, or in a ship, or on foot. This is the usual, through corrupt orthography.” See American Dictionary Of The English Language By Noah Webster, 1828.

It is thus well established that the right to travel by an American/ citizen on the public roads is a fundamental and constitutional right and, in fact, inalienable and natural right, one inherent in an American/ citizen and secured by the Organic Law of the Land.

The concept that traveling upon the roads is a basis fundamental right of every citizen, i.e., American, in the land is not a new concept in law. The right of every person to freely travel on public ways is well grounded in the ancient common law:

A highway according to the common law, is a place in which all the people have a right to pass. A common street and public highway are the same, and any way which is common to all the people may be called a highway. Skinner v. Town of Weathersfield, 63 A. 142, 143; 78 Vt. 410.

At common law every member of the public has a right to use, in a reasonable manner and with due care, public roads, inclusive of public bridges. Shell Oil Co. v Jackson County , 193 S.W. 2d 268, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-1946).

In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 27 L.Ed.2d 272, 92 S.Ct. 260, Brennan, joined by White and Marshall stated that for more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional right of all citizens to unhindered interstate travel and that both the existence of this right and its fundamental importance in America has been long been established beyond question. Also see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 Lawyer’s Edition 2nd 272, 92 S.Ct. 995, 56 Columbia L. Rev. 47.

The rule is firmly established that the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any state of the Union . . . without molestation [restriction] is secured and protected by the United States Constitution.” See 16A Am Jur 2d 607 Page 550-6, Freedom to travel.

((( An inhabitant on the land will always have an equal or greater than any other class of citizen. )))

It has been held directly in a number of cases that at common law a driver of a vehicle has the right to drive upon any part of the highway. Boyer v North End Drayage Co., 67 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Mo. App.-1934).

The common law rule was that a public highway was a “way common and free to all the king’s subjects to pass and repass at liberty,” and this court recognized that the right to travel a highway belongs to everybody in the state,. . .that a highway belongs to the public, and is free and common as a way to every citizen on the land. House-Wives League v. City of Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 685, 688-89.

In quoting from some old English law books on the common law, the Tennessee Chancery Appeals Court stated the following:

Under the general law a public street is a public highway, and, if a highway, it is a road which every citizen has a right to use. The right of the citizen to pass and repass on it is limited to no particular part of it for, as said in the books, “the public are entitled not only to a free passage along the highway, but to a free passage along any portion of it not in the actual use of some other traveler.” 1 Hawk. P.C. 22; Ang. & D. Highways, ‘ 226. *** Under the common law a public highway was a way common and free to all the king’s subjects to pass and repass at liberty. State v. Stroud 52 S.W. 697, 698 (Tenn.-1899); Also see, 3 Kent, Comm. 432

The complete freedom and common right to travel on the highways is so old and well established that it has never been questioned, until this century. The general recognition of this right is due to its fundamental importance in our civilized society. It thus is a fundamental right that was secured by both Federal and State constitutions.

There can be no denial of the general proposition hat every citizen of the United States, and every citizen of each state of the Union, as an attribute of personal liberty, has the right ordinarily, of free transit from, or through the territory of any State. This freedom of egress or ingress is guaranteed to all by the clearest implications of the Federal, as well as of the State constitution. It has been said that even in England, whence our system of jurisprudence was derived, the right to personal liberty did not depend on any express statute, but “it was the birthright of every freeman.”-Cooley’s Const. Lim. 342.

This right was said by Sir William Blackstone to consist in “the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or of moving one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law.” 1 Bl. Comm. 134 Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499, 504-505.

The use of roads for travel is a very ancient practice. The right to travel upon them has been recognized since the early Roman Empire. This right to freely travel as an attribute of personal liberty was so basic and fundamental in early America that it never became the subject matter of colonial legislation. Not even under the tyranny of King George III was the right to travel suppressed. Liberty was recognized and secured by all of the original state constitutions. When Connecticut was a Colony, its citizens possessed this liberty and right to travel. The Constitution of Connecticut when adopted secured this inalienable right to liberty, locomotion, or travel on the public ways.

That the lower court/tribunal and Appellee should then ignore and trample over the meaning and original intent of the State Constitution and recognize only current statutes set by quasi legislation, is not only being legally nearsighted but is a gross violation of their oath of office. As a result the trial court/tribunal gravely erred in its decision. The liberty to travel and to move from place to place, which existed under the common law, and which existed in colonial America, also exists under the State Constitutions. The liberty in the Constitution secures the same rights it included at common law and meaning the same thing-a right to travel.

Freedom of locomotion, although subject to proper restrictions, is included in the >liberty guaranteed by State Constitution. Commonwealth v. Doe, 167 A. 241, 242: 109 Pa. Super. 187.

This inalienable and constitutional right to travel on public roads includes the use of an automobile as a means of conveyance. Since the invention of the automobile the courts of this land have universally recognized the automobile not only as a lawful means of conveyance, but one that has equal rights with other modes of travel using public ways:

The law does not denounce motor carriages, as such, on public ways.* * * they have an equal right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads.* * * It is improper to say that the driver of the horse has rights in the roads superior to the driver of the automobile. Both have the right to use the easement. Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 468.

The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle. House v. Cramer, 112 N.W. 3; 134 Iowa 374; Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co. 57 So. 233, 237, 62 Fla. 166.

Automobiles have the right to use the highways of the State on an equal footing with other vehicles. Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co. v Yeiser, 141 Ky. 15.

Each citizen has the absolute right to choose for himself the mode of conveyance he desires, whether it be by wagon or carriage, by horse, motor or electric car, or by bicycle, or astride of a horse, subject to the sole condition that he will observe all those requirements that are known as the law of the road. Swift v City of Topeka, 43 Kansas 671, 674.

A farmer has the same right to the use of the highways of the state, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, as any other citizen. Draffin v. Massey, 92 S.E.2d 38, 42.

There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets of cities, or highways in the rural districts. Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456.

The automobile may be used with safety to others users of the highway, and in its proper use upon the highways there is an equal right with the users of other vehicles properly upon the highways. The law recognizes such right of use upon general principles. Brinkman v Pacholike, 84 N.E. 762, 764, 41 Ind. App. 662, 666.

Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages. Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 205; See also: Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 202 Ill. 66; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 28-29.

Though, as we have said, automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highways with horses and carriages. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354. Matson v. Dawson, 178 N.W. 2d 588, 591.

A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy the public highways with other vehicles in common use. Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41.

There is no distinction made by these authorities (and many others) in the mode of travel a citizen chooses to use on a public way. A citizen has the same inalienable right to travel on a public road by use of an automobile as another citizen does traveling on foot or bicycle thereon:

A highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or with any kind of vehicle. Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 129 S.E. 861, 867, 161 Ga. 148, 159; Holland v. Shackelford, 137 S.E. 2d 298, 304, 220 Ga. 104; Stavola v. Palmer, 73 A.2d 831, 838, 136 Conn. 670

Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles. Doherty v. Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 197 Mass. 241, 246; Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 486; Smiley v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 157, 158.

The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway,* * * A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle. Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236.

A traveler on foot has the same right to use of the public highway as an automobile or any other vehicle. Cecchi v. Lindsay, 75 Atl. 376, 377, 1 Boyce (Del.) 185.

To further qualify the right to travel on the public roads by way of an automobile, several courts have made the obvious connection between its use and that of a constitutional liberty or as an individual right. This could only be the natural conclusion: If traveling per se is an inalienable and constitutional right, and if the automobiles has “equal rights” with the older forms of travel such as on foot or horseback, the logical deduction here is that traveling by way of an automobile on a public way is a constitutional, inalienable, and fundamental right:

The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen not be deprived without due process of law. Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 872; 87 R.I. 226, 231 (1958). See also: Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963).

The right to operate a motor vehicle [an automobile] upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48; 91 Idaho 99 (1966).

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways* * *includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business.* * *The rights aforesaid, being fundamental, are constitutional rights. Teche Lines v. Danforth, 12 So.2d 784, 787 (Miss.-1943). See also Thompson v. Smith, supra.

Thus, there can be no question that the defendant has an inherent, constitutional, and inalienable right to travel in his automobile on the public roads and streets, whether in Connecticut or anywhere else in the several states in Union. Will This court/tribunal admit that the defendant has a constitutional right to travel in his automobile or state that the defendant has not a right to use the streets and highways for travel without a driver’s license (not for gain)? Will it become obvious that this lower court/tribunal avoided the facts and preferred not to recognize the true nature of the defendant’s vested and constitutional rights in this case?

The liberty to travel in this land is interwoven into the fabric of the Organic Law of the United States of America and Connecticut. It is one of our most sacred and fundamental rights. It thus is one that can never be attacked, violated, suppressed, or destroyed by any level or branch of government. This would be in total defiance and contradiction to the very purpose our form of government was established, that being to secure such inherent and natural rights:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed… The Declaration of Independence-1776.

It is apparent the lower court has grossly underestimated the broad spectrum of rights that are encompassed in the terms inalienable rights or Constitutional Rights, along with their meaning and origin. These rights, being a gift of God, were secured by the Constitution of Connecticut, and cannot be dissolved away by legislative acts. Every inherent and inalienable right at common law, and which is in existence to date, when our constitution was adopted:

The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of government activity . It thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits and modes of thought and life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the time of its adoption to the extent and as therein stated. Dean v. Paolicelli, 72 S.E. 2d 506, 510; 194 Va. 219 (1952).

Hence, it may be said with great propriety, that a constitution measures the powers of the rules, but it does not measure the rights of the governed; that is not the origin of rights, nor the fountain of law-but it is the “framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, modes of thought.” Cooley Con. Lim., 37 Atchison & Nebraska R.R. Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37, 41.

The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state, or federal, or even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man, by endowment of the Creator, and are merely reaffirmed in the Constitution, and restricted only to the extent that they have been voluntarily surrendered by the citizenship to the agencies of government. The people’s rights are not derived from the government, but the government’s authority comes from the people. The Constitution but states again these rights already existing, and when legislative encroachment by the nation, state, or municipality invade these original and preserved rights, it is the duty of the courts to so declare, and to afford the necessary relief. City of Dallas et al. v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 945-46 (Tex-1922).

There is nothing primitive about a State Constitution. It is based upon the pre-existing laws, rights habits, and modes of thought of the people who ordained it, * * *and must be construed in the light of this fact. Commonwealth v City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 696 (1932).

The purpose and intent of a written constitution is to preserve the ancient rights held at common law, and constitutional provisions are to be so interpreted (See, American Jurisprudence, 2nd Ed., Vol. 16, ‘ 321). It thus becomes plain that all rights that the people inherently possessed when Connecticut was a Colony, were secured by the Constitution of Pennsylvania when adopted. That the right to freely travel, by what ever means available, on public ways had existed at that time cannot be doubted. The people who adopted the Constitution certainly did not “surrender” their liberty to freely travel by becoming citizens and/or residents of Connecticut. In fact they made sure that the Constitution would “secure the same to ourselves and our posterity.” This is the main reason why the Constitution was “ordained and established” (I bid).

This principle, along with the broad meaning of liberty, were evidently not understood by the trial court. Defendant would have prohibiting the State from restricting his right to travel via licensing. Thus, the trial court believes that if a right is not exactly spelled out in the Constitution (such as the right to travel), then it constitutionally does not exist. It has been held by a sister State, Minnesota Supreme Court that citizens possess such rights whether they are enumerated in a constitution or not:

The rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens exist notwithstanding there is no specific enumeration thereof in state constitutions. These instruments measure the powers of rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed.* * *The constitution of Minnesota specifically recognizes the right to life, liberty or property,” but does not attempt to enumerate all “the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof It, however, significantly provides: The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people. Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 225; 14 N.W. 2d 400 (1944).

It should be quite obvious from the forgoing authorities that a citizen does have an inalienable and Constitutional right to travel on the public highways, which includes the use of an automobile as a means of conveyance. This means the State Legislature cannot impair or suspend this Constitutional right or prohibit the Defendant from exercising it.

We realize that the police is elastic to meet changing conditions and changing needs, yet it cannot be used to abrogate or limit personal liberty or property rights contrary to constitutional sanction. City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E. 2d 412, 414; 141 Ohio St. 535.

By the expression constitutional right, as just used, we mean a right guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution and so guaranteed as to prevent legislative interference with that right. Delaney v. Plunkett, 91 S.E. 561; 146 Ga. 547.

The right to travel on the land was an inherent right, which had existed before the adoption of Connecticut’s Constitution. This right includes all modes of travel, whether by horse, wagon, or carriage, or by walking, and also includes automobiles (not for gain) since they have equal rights with other modes of travel. Thus, the defendant is here again claiming and asserting his inalienable and constitutional right to travel on the public roads of this land, whether on foot, or by bicycle, or automobile or other means of conveyance existing or yet to be discovered. This is a right under the Constitution of Connecticut, which this court is bound to uphold and protect.

Hey, you don’t require soldiers to have driver licenses? It’s a denial of equal protection to license some but not others.

Defendant already possess an inherent and constitutional right to travel and that the statutes would be an invasion and trespass on his rights. This trespass would of course be unconstitutional. Thus, while the statute used against the defendant may be constitutionally applied to certain individuals under certain circumstances, they are invalid as they are applied to and enforced upon the defendant. So even though the statutes themselves may be valid when applied to certain persons, such as those involved in commerce, for profit, they cannot be lawfully applied to the defendant due to the legal facts surrounding this case(e.g. defendant’s rights, status, etc.). This legal reasoning has been upheld in a sister State Supreme Court:

We have held in a number of cases that an ordinance may be reasonable and proper as applied to one set of facts and arbitrary and invalid when enforced under other circumstances. State v Perry, 204, 207 (1964).

This case involves the invasion and violation of constitutional rights. These rights are the supreme law of the State. The burden on the State is great.

We demand the same standard as for speech. Most folks would rather go a day without talking than lose their driving privileges for a day. It’s that important.

Where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 232; 85 Cal. Rept. 1 (1970).

The constitutional rights of liberty and property may be limited only to the extent necessary to subserve the public interest. Cameron v. International Alliance, Etc., 176 Atl. 692, 700; 118 N.J. Eq. 11 (1935).

The Nature of a License:

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W. 2d 493; 145 Tex. 237, 241.

The purpose of a license is to make lawful what would be unlawful without it. State v. Minneapolis- St. Paul Metro Airports Commission, 25 N.W. 2d 718, 725.

A license is a right granted by some competent authority to do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. Beard v. City of Atlanta, 86 S.E. 2d 672, 676; 91 Ga. App. 584.

A license confers the right to do that which without the license would be unlawful. Antlers Athletic Ass’n v. Hartung, 274 P. 831, 832; 85 Colo. 125

A license is a mere permit to do something that without it would be unlawful. Littleton v. Burgess, 82 P. 864, 866; 14 Wyo. 173.

Generally, a license is a permit to do what, without a license, would not be lawful. Bateman v City of Winter Park, 37 So. 2d 362, 363; 160 Fla. 906.

Definition: License: A permission, accorded by a competent authority, conferring the right to do some act which without such authorization would be illegal, or would be a trespass or a tort. Black’s Law Dicti0onary, 2d Ed. P. 723 (1910).

Where this court/tribunal may be correct in asserting that the defendant is required to have a driver’s License,” it must be then, according to the above authorities, because it is “unlawful” for him to freely travel in his automobile on the public roads. However, the foregoing cases show that the automobile, as a means of conveyance, is just as lawful as traveling on foot, horse, or bicycle since their rights are mutual, equal, and coordinate-a right, which was secured by the Constitution of Connecticut. Thus, the use of an automobile is lawful because it involves the exercise of a Constitutional Right, and the legislature cannot make the exercise of such a right unlawful by requiring a license of citizens (Americans) before allowed to exercise that right. It has been well settled that it is lawful for a citizen to travel using an automobile as a means of conveyance.

Automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highway with horses and carriages, * * *. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354; 152 Mo. App. 415.

Automobiles are a lawful means of conveyance, and have equal rights upon the public roads with horses and carriages * * *. Shinkle v. McCullough, 77 S.W. 196, 197; 116 Ky. 960; Christy v. Elliott, 74 N.E. 1037, 1041; 216 Ill. 31; Fletcher v. Dixon, 68 Atl. 875, 877 (Md.)

Under the principles and rules of the common law, automobiles should be recognized as lawful vehicles. Sapp v. Hunter, 115 S.W. 463, 466, 134 Mo. App. 685

The case history of the automobile shows that it has always been lawful to travel on the public roads and streets with an automobile. The obvious reason why it is lawful to travel on the public roads by whatever means of conveyance available is that the public roads belong to the people or the public generally and were established or dedicated for the purpose of common travel.

The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and every citizen of the state has a right to the use thereof. Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 639.

It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; * * *. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 264.

A highway belongs to the public, and is free and common as a way to every citizen on the land. House-Wives League v. City of Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 685, 689.

It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen of the state. Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547.

The public highways belong to the people for use in the ordinary way. Barney v. Board of Railroad Com’rs, 17 Pac. 2d 82, 85 (Mont.-1932)

The streets of the city belong to the public. For ordinary use and general transportation and traffic, they are free and common to all, and any control sought to be exercised over them must be such as will not defeat or seriously interfere with their enjoyment. Melconian v. Grand Rapids, 188 N.W. 521, 524.

The streets belong to the public, the city being its trustee ,* * *. Green v. City of San Antonio, 178 S.W. 6, 9.

To make travel by automobile unlawful (by requiring a license) would violate the concept that their use as a means of conveyance is to be equal with citizens using other modes of conveyance. Where a driver’s license is valid against the defendant, there would now exist a “distinction” as to the degree of right to the use of the public roads for travel. Other modes of travel are not to have a superior right in the use of public ways over one using a specific mode of conveyance:

Persons making use of horses as a means of travel or traffic by the highways have no rights therein superior to those who make use of the ways in other modes,* * * Improved methods of locomotion are perfectly admissible if any shall be discovered, and they cannot be executed from the existing public roads* * * A highway is a public way for the use of the public in general, for passage and traffic, without distinction. Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich, 212, 216, 22 Am. Rep. 522.

But the streets of a city may be as freely used by those who ride in automobiles as by pedestrians or travelers. Corcoran v. City of New York, 188 N.Y. 131, 139.

There is no doubt that the owners of automobiles have the same rights in the streets and highways of the State that the drivers of horses have. Wright v Crane, 142 Mich. 508, 510.

Automobiles* * * are lawful vehicles and as such are entitled to the privilege of using the public highways. Their drivers have equal rights with the occupants of wagons, carriages, and other vehicles. Hall v. Compton, 130 Mo. App. 675, 680.

Where automobiles are a lawful means of travel, and where they have the same rights upon the road as more ancient means of travel, then how can it be it that one must have a license before being allowed to travel in an automobile? Could one be required to have a license to travel by wagon, by horseback, by foot, or by boat on a river? All of history declares that as new modes of travel, possessing the natural, fundamental right to be used for travel:

If there is any one fact established in the history of society and of the law itself, it is that the mode of exercising this easement [highways] is expansive, developing, and growing as civilizations. In the most primitive state of society the conception of a highway was merely a footpath; in a slightly more advanced state it included the idea of a way for pack animals-constituting, respectively, the actus, and the vi of the Romans. And thus the methods of using public highways expanded with the growth of civilization, until today our urban highways are devoted to a variety of uses not known in former times. Carter v Northwestern Telephone Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. 111; Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 4.

It is now well settled by all the courts that automobiles are lawful modern modes of travel and convenience, and that they have the same right upon the public highways as any other means of conveyance.* * * In all human activities the law keeps up with the improvements and progress brought about by discovery and invention. Riley v. Fisher, 146 S.W. 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App.).

The point made here is that all modes of travel have an equal right to freely use the public roads for common travel. In Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555, the Minnesota Supreme Court had pointed out this principle by showing that A person riding a bicycle upon the public highways has the same rights in so doing as persons using other vehicles thereon. It also pointed out that an older form of travel, has no right superior to the more modern forms of conveyance because the rights of each are equal. Thus, the legislature cannot make it unlawful for a citizen to travel on the public highways when using an automobile (or a light weight pick-up vehicle use for personal conveyance, not for gain) by compelling one to take out a driver’s license, thereby stating it is unlawful to travel in that mode and putting a burden one not on other Americans.

To compel one who uses his automobile for his private business and pleasure only, to submit to an examination and to take out a license (if the examining board see fit to grant it) is imposing a burden upon one class of citizens in the use of the streets, not imposed upon the others. We must therefore hold this ordinance, so far as it obliges appellee to take out a license before he can use his own automobile in his own business or for his own pleasure, is beyond the power of the city counsel, and is therefore void. City of Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94, 99-100.

This same legal principle is applicable in this case. The Defendant can lawfully travel in his automobile due to his Constitutionally guaranteed right to do so. This right he has equally with all citizens/Americans using the public road for travel. These principles would be abrogated if he is compelled to take out a license.

A further study into the nature of a license will continue to show that the defendant is not required to have a license to travel in his automobiles, and thus does not come under the purview of Title14, where the defendant is required to have a driver’s license in the Connecticut General Statutes. This is due to the fact that a license can only grant or confer a right or privilege, which does not legally exist without a license.

The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not exist without it. Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W. 2d 493; 145 Tex. 237, 241.

To license means to confer on a person the right to do something which otherwise he would not have the right to do. City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 S.W. 2d 248, 253; 308 Ky. 420.

The object of license is to confer right or power which does not exist without it and exercise of which without license would be illegal. Inter-City Coach Lines v. Harrison, 157 S.E. 673, 676; 172 Ga. 390.

According to these authorities, a driver’s license” apparently grants or confers some sort of right or privilege. A driver’s license then can only be required of someone who does not have an inherent right to use the public roads. The defendant, as previously shown, already possesses an inalienable and constitutional right to use the public roads in his travels, and therefore does not need to secure the right to do so by way of a license.

A license is a privilege granted by the State,* * *To constitute a privilege, the grant must confer authority to do something which, without the grant, would be illegal; for if what is to be done under the license is open to every one without it, the grant would be merely idle and nugatory, conferring no privilege whatever. A license, therefore implying a privilege, cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride and drive over the streets of the city without charge and without toll. City of Chicago v. Collins et al, 51 N.E. 907, 910.

The driver’s license, as it applies to the defendant, is merely idle and nugatory because the right it confers, or pretends to confer, are already free and open to him as an inherent right by the Connecticut Constitution. The driver’s license cannot possibly grant the Connecticut a right to travel on the public roads, when he already possesses an inherent right to do so. It has been said that the individuals ordinary right to the free use of the streets for travel “cannot be taken from him” See State v. McCarthy, 171 So. 314, 316 (Fla.-1936). Where a State can require an American/citizen to obtain a license before he is allowed to travel, the State has effectually taken his right to travel away from him.

The only persons that the courts have repeatedly recognized as having no inherent right to use an automobile on a public road are those who are engaged in commercial activity ; such as common carriers, truck drivers, chauffeurs, taxi drivers, etc. See Title 18 United States Code §31. In other words, those who use the public roads for business or personal gain have no inherent right to use the roads as such. They therefore are subject to licensing because their use of the road is special and extraordinary and can be deemed unlawful. The courts have repeatedly shown the distinction between the rights of citizens using the roads for common travel from one using them for commercial purposes:

The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain, in the running of a stage coach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a common right, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but, as to the latter, its power is broader, the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all he authorities. Ex parte M.T. Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 579; 85 S.E. 781 (1915); Cited by: Schultz v. City of Duluth, 163 Minn. 65, 69, 203 N.W. 449; Scott v. Hart, 128 Miss. 353; State v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 240; Cummings v. Jones, 79 Ore. 276, 280; Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657; et al.

In a case involving a person engaged in transporting property under contract for hire by truck on the highways, the Supreme Court of Montana revealed the nature of such activity in comparison to one using the roads for travel:

While a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain. For the latter purposes no person has vested right in the use of the highways of the state, but is a privilege or license which the Legislature may grant or withhold in its discretion, or which it may grant upon such conditions as it may see fit to impose. Barney v. Board of Railroad Com’rs, 17 Pac. 2d 82, 85 (Mont.-1932).

It has been said, a license to operate an automobile is not property, but a mere privilege. This is true, all licenses are a privilege. But nowhere does it say that travel in an automobile is a mere privilege. The Legislature cannot make travel upon the roads and highways conditional upon the obtaining of a license, because the act of ordinary travel is not a privilege but an ordinary right. The Legislature can, however, require a license for one using the roads for profit for such use is a privilege:

The use of the streets as a place of business or as a main instrumentality of business is accorded as a mere privilege and not as a matter of natural right. Reo Bus Line Co. v. Bus Line Co., 272 S.W. 18, 20, 209 Ky. 40.

The Appellant/Defendant has never used his automobile for private gain or commercial activity on the public roads, but rather was using his inherent right to travel thereon prior to his arrest. Even though this fact is true and correct, the Appellant/Defendant does not deal with any type of commerce with his automobile for gain. Cases such as: Chicago v. Collins, Thompson v. Smith, House v. Cramer, et al., are not related to interstate commerce or even interstate travel.

The Driver’s License is of a commercial nature and character. Such licenses are and can only be used to grant permission to one using the roads in a commercial capacity, and have no relation to their use in the exercise of the fundamental right to travel:

The ordinary use of the streets by the citizens is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him by the city and may only be controlled by reasonable regulation, while the right to use the streets for conducting thereupon a private business of any character is not an inherent or vested right and can only be acquired by permission or license form the city. Davis v. City of Houston, 264 S.W. 625, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.); State v. Quigg, 114 So. 859, 862 (Fla.-1927). See Also: Lane v. Whitaker, 275 F. 476, 480.

The Appellant, prior to his arrest, was traveling in his Toyota, a 1989, on the public roads in Connecticut by common law right, and thus having equal rights with other travelers, such as pedestrians, bicyclists, horse and carriages, etc., all of which have an inalienable right of free passage on the public road. Therefore, the defendant needs no license to obtain a right (free passage on a public road) he already possesses. The State cannot compel the Appellant to acquire a license before he is allowed to exercise his constitutional right of liberty and to travel. This same principle holds true regarding the exercise of all constitutional rights there can be no license required before they are allowed to be exercised. For instance, in a case regarding the right of freedom of the press, the United States Supreme Court held that a law, which prohibits the distribution of printing materials except by license, is invalid. The Court stated, to wit:

We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjection it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his “Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicenced Printers.” Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1937); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1939).

Regarding the constitutional right to freedom of speech, Justice Douglas had stated in a U.S. Supreme Court decision that: “No one may be required to obtain a license in order to speak.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543 (1944). Thus, “The State” can no more license the Appellant’s right to travel in his automobile than it could license his right to print or speak, for they are all inalienable rights.

The reason a right cannot be licensed is that the license (a statutory right) would require the Appellant to surrender his inalienable right in lieu thereof, just to obtain permission (i.e. license) to do what he already has a right to do. The State has no power to compel a citizen to surrender an inalienable right:

Inalienable, means incapable of being surrendered or transferred, at least without one’s consent. Morrison v. State, Mo. App. 252 S.W. 2d 97, 101.

The right of liberty and the right to move from place to place are natural and inalienable rights, endowed to us by our Creator, and secured by the Constitution of Connecticut. They thus are rights that the Defendant possesses and he refuses to surrender or transfer such rights to the State by way of licensing.

In Ex parte Dickey, supra, et al., the court pointed out the distinction in legislative power over a citizen using the public roads for ordinary travel, over one using them in a commercial capacity. The courts holding is: “As to the former (the citizen using the road for common travel) the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but, as to the latter, its power is broader, the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others.” We see that the legislature has the power to preclude or prevent those engaged in commercial activity from being on the public roads, but no such power is extended over the citizenry using it for ordinary travel. In this case the legislative power is limited to mere regulation.

Where a citizen is required to have a license before he can travel anywhere in the several States, the licensor has absolute power and control over his/her liberty to travel, to earn a living, transport his property, etc. The licensor (The Department of Motor Vehicles) would then have complete authority not only to grant, but also to prevent, revoke, or prohibit an American and/or citizen’s liberty and right to travel

A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39, 69 C.A. 2d 639; Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 43 F.2d 116, 118.

The authority to license implies the power to prohibit, such being the meaning of the term. The City of Burlington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa 673, 674.

A license, pure and simple, is a mere personal privilege, and it is revocable at law, at the pleasure of the licensor, even when money has been paid for it. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 133 A.2d 373, 385; 45 N.J. Super. 445.

The power of the legislature over the common travel of citizens extends only to such reasonable regulations that would promote safe travel for all. It never included the power to prohibit it by way of licensing. Such authority to prohibit a right would not conform to or fulfill the purpose and meaning of “regulate.”

Regulate implies arranging in proper order and controlling a thing or condition which already exists and is not synonymous with prohibit. Yaworski v. Town of Canterbury, 154 A.2d 758, 760; 21 Conn. Sup. 347.

The power to regulate does not fairly mean the power to prohibit. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 180.

Regulate, as ordinarily used, means to subject to rules or restrictions, to adjust by rule or method, to govern, and is not synonymous with prohibit. Simpkins v. State, P 168, 170; 35 Okla. Cr. 14

The power to license is the power to prohibit and does not conform to proper regulation of a Constitutional right. Licensing is an “extraordinary” measure, which cannot be used to regulate an ordinary right, like the right of travel, since it prohibits that right.

Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience. Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 206.

Also, once a person has accepted a license, his rights become limited by the terms of the license or rules of the licensor. Any Constitutional rights that would normally stand above the rules under a license, now become limited by and subordinate to the terms and rules under the license statute or by the licensor:

The rights o a licensee can rise no higher than the terms of the statute or ordinance by which he became the holder. Steves v. Robie, 139 Me. 359, 363.

A license, such as a drivers license, allows the licensor to do things to or require things of the licensee that would otherwise be outside the power of the State, or a trespass upon his constitutional rights, such as blood and breath tests, mandatory seat belt use, etc., not to mention excluding him and his automobile from he public roads. This type of prohibitive power to exclude one from traveling on the public road by way of licensing, could only apply to those who had no inherent right to use the streets in the first place, such as a common carrier, as explained in Ex parte Dickey.

In Easton v Dowdy, 219 Ga. 555, the holding in the Georgia Supreme Court with said cite, that where someone wishes to use the public roads for business purposes, such as a “taxicab business,” the licensor can “grant or refuse a license in their discretion.” Also, the licensor can “prescribe such terms and conditions as it may see fit, and individuals desiring to avail themselves of such permission must comply with such terms and conditions, whether they are reasonable or unreasonable.” The same situation would hold true with a driver”s license. They thus are an unreasonable mode of regulating rights.

The police power of the States extends only to such measures as are reasonable, and the general rule is that all police regulations must be reasonable under all circumstances. Ex parte A.M. Smythe, 116 Tex. Crim. 146, 147; 28 S.W. 2d 161.

To transcend beyond the bounds of reasonable regulations of a constitutional right would constitute an invasion of that right. The reasonable regulation of a constitutional right, such as the right to freely travel on a public way, never included the power to prohibit it by licensing a person. Since “regulation is inconsistent with prohibition or exclusion” (Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 206), licensing is inconsistent with proper regulation of a right. This lower court/tribunal apparently believes this Appellant is required to have a license, making the assumption that since the legislature has the authority to establish reasonable regulations for common travel, it also has the power to license it. This, of course, is a false assumption. The following holdings will correct this incorrect assumption at the heartland.

Does the power to regulate confer the right to license? We think not…We discover that to license and to regulate do not require the exercise of the same power, and the same objects are not attained by the acts authorized, and this being settled leads to the conclusion that the first cannot be exercised under authority to do the last. See The City of Burlington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa 673, 674.

The power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to license. In passing on the question of whether in a particular case the power to regulate includes the power to license, it is well to bear in mind the distinction between regulation and license. Regulations apply equally to all. A license, however, gives to the licensee a special privilege not accorded to others and which he himself otherwise would not enjoy. Once a power to license exists, certain acts becomes illegal for all who have not been licensed. Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 336-37; 96 N.W. 2d 585

The “act” of traveling in the several states or Connecticut has never been illegal. Nor is the nature of the act such that it can be illegal or regarded as a “special privilege.” it would be foolish and unconstitutional to say it is. Traveling in this country, regardless of what mode of conveyance used, has never been regarded as such because the power to license a citizen for exercising this right has never existed. This is because reasonable regulations of an inalienable right do not include compelling a citizen to waive his constitutional rights by submitting him to licensing, the very nature of which subjects the licensee to rules that can be unreasonable or a further trespass on his rights. In short, the exercise of an inalienable right cannot be made illegal by subjecting a person to a license. Legislative statute or fiat cannot change the nature of a constitutional right. The right or liberty to freely travel, which had existed when the Constitution of Connecticut was adopted, exists today, as the right is unchangeable:

Two basic purpose of a written constitution are:

1: Securing to the people certain unchangeable rights and remedies;

2: Curtailment of unrestricted governmental activity within certain defined fields.

Authority: Du Pont v. Du Pont, 85 A. 2d 724, 728 (Del.B1951)

It becomes apparent that this court/tribunal is trying to change the purpose and intent of the Constitution of Connecticut. It is also apparent that this legislative tribunal (a de facto court) is trying to apply new and different legal principal to the exercise of constitutional rights that were originally beyond the power of The State to apply. The fact that an automobile is now being used to exercise this unchangeable inherent right to freely travel makes no difference in this case because, as previously shown, automobiles and pick-up vehicles have the “same right” (House v Cramer, supra) as those modes of travel used since the adoption of Connecticut’s Constitution. Thus, the same legal principles apply only to the automobile as with other modes of travel:

That the use of automobiles on the highways for business or recreation is unlawful, is no longer open to question. Such use involves only the application of a new appliance and mode of travel, rather than any new legal principle. Deputy v. Kimmell, 73 W. Va. 595, 597 (1914).

Neither the state nor the Motor Vehicle Department can license the Defendant for traveling in an automobile any more than it could have licensed one traveling on foot or horse or carriage when the California Constitution was adopted.

It is obvious the intent of the Constitution was to preserve the inherent right and liberty of people to freely travel, and no absolute power to license people before they were allowed to exercise this basic right was ever imagined or considered. This intent of the Constitution exists to day and is applicable to the Appellant traveling in his automobile/pick-up vehicle.

The means which a constitutional provision had when adopted, it has today; its intent does not change with time nor with conditions; while it operates upon new subjects and change conditions, it operates with the same meaning and intent which it had when formulated and adopted. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) Vol. 1, p. 123. As judge Cooley stated, to wit: AA constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seems desirable. Travelers’ Ins. C. v. Marshall, 76 S.W. (2d) 1007, 1011; 124 Texas 45.

This legislative court is bound to uphold the Constitution of Connecticut as it was written, which it reluctantly failed to do in its biased and distorted decision, one which was totally unsupported by fact or law. The Appellant can use an automobile/pick-up vehicle in his travel with the same freedom and legal right as that which was intended under the Constitution of Connecticut for a man to freely walk or ride his horse on the public road. The conditions may change but the meaning of the law does not. The trial court had all ignored and evaded the manner of constitutional law and rights in its decision. The court was apparently aware that if it had applied and upheld the rights and legal principles that were secured and fixed by Constitution, that it could never apply any driver’s licensing statutes to the Defendant for traveling in his automobile to date. Will this legislative court having heard the above avoid the arguments in this matter by twisting them out of context, and then stating that the Defendants arguments are not supported by case law or statute? While this has been shown to be totally false, it is strange that this legislative court has not stated that Constitutional law did not support the arguments presented! If such issues were of paramount importance why would this legislative court avoid this matter? This legislative court may find it necessary to hold the police power of this State as an absolute power over the Appellant’s Constitutional, inherent, and unalienable rights. This false position may have been necessary for them to take as being the only way such licensing legislation could be upheld and applied to the Defendant, not to mention giving the police a bear hug. The Appellant’s liberty and inherent right to freely travel are paramount over the police powers and cannot be superseded by licensing.

The powers of government, under our system, are nowhere absolute. They are but grants of authority from the people, and are limited to their true purpose. The fundamental rights of the people are inherent and have not been yielded to governmental control. They are not the subjects of government authority. They are the subjects of individual authority. Constitutional powers can never transcend constitutional rights. The police power is subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon every power of government; and it will not be suffered to invade or impair the fundamental liberties of the citizen, those natural rights which are the chief concern of the Constitution and for whose protection it was ordained by the people.* * * It [a constitutional right], is not a right, therefore, over which the police power is paramount. Like every other fundamental liberty, it is a right to which the police power is subordinate. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 515; 111 Tex. 350 (1921). Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 306-07; 128 Atl. 50, 59 (1925).

Since the police power is subordinate to constitutional rights, the police power cannot possibly license (i.e. prohibit, make unlawful, or turn in to a privilege) the exercise of such a right, and thereby “transcend” such a right and put itself in a superior position. These rights are the most important part of the law of the land and such rights are beyond the reach of legislative interference. Thus the police power cannot constitutionally license these rights because to require a license by statute for the right to travel is to infer that the citizen has no inherent, vested or constitutional right to travel. This is the argument of the defendant from the very beginning of this case, and one that this legislative court has continually evaded and avoided. The driver’s license is an unwarranted interference with the Appellant’s fundamental right of travel in his automobile.

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways* * *includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon,* * *The rights aforesaid, being fundamental, are constitutional rights, and while the exercise thereof may be reasonably regulated by legislative act in pursuant of the police power of the State, and although those powers are broad, they do not rise above those privileges which are embedded in the constitutional structure. The police power cannot justify the enactment of any law which amounts to an arbitrary and unwarranted interference with, or unreasonable restriction on, those rights of the citizen which are fundamental. Teche Lines v. Danforth, 12 So. 2d 784, 787-88 (1943).

It is an undisputed fact that the courts/tribunals having created smoke screens by avoiding the above said subject matters, having nothing to do with the subject matters at hand, and has also tried to justify licensing by inferring it is imposed under the police power in the interest of public safety. Working with such unclean hands by administrators is unacceptable in what was designed by the founding fathers as Honorable, now brings a whole new meaning into Superior court/tribunal. This lower court/tribunal nonetheless yet to show how much licensing promotes public safety and welfare, and thus could not even justify or verify. This said court tribunal using the police power as a cover for its inept statements. The fact is that the police power cannot invade the area of inherent rights.

Where the ostensible object of an enactment is to secure the public comfort, welfare, or safety, it must appear to be adopted to that end. It cannot invade the rights of persons and property under the guise of a mere police regulation. City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447, 451 (1938).

But the police power, even as thus defined, vague and vast as it is, has its limitations, and it cannot justify and act which violates the prohibitions, expressed or implied, of the state or federal constitutions. If this were not so, and if the police power were superior to the constitution and if it extended to all objects which could be embraced within the meaning of the words “general welfare,” as defined by the lexicographers, the constitutions would be so much waste paper, because no right of the individual would be beyond its reach, and every property right and personal privilege and immunity of the citizen could be invaded at the will of the state, whenever in its judgment the convenience, prosperity, or mental or physical comfort of the public required it. Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349, 357; 181 A. 801, 803.

The argument that the driver’s license must be forced on each and every citizen for the sake of public safety, and thereby assuring only competent drivers are on the road, make a waste of paper of the Constitution by ignoring the fundamental rights involved. The administrators of the lower court/tribunal on public safety and welfare are actually in itself a false assumption. The first licensing law aimed at the private citizen in 1933, was required for a person to obtain a driver’s license under this act, was to sign an application stating that he is competent to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways, and pay 25 cents. Thus, the most illiterate and incompetent person could obtain a license. Anyone who had a visual, mental, or physical impairment could obtain a license, and anyone who was unfamiliar with the rules of the road or had never used an automobile could obtain a license. And indeed this did happen.

The driver’s license is a typical example of an abridgement of freedom by gradual and stealthy encroachments. The IRS is another example. When the Connecticut license law was passed on April 21, 1933 (just a short time after FDR declared the United States bankrupt on March 9, 1933), it did not go into effect for almost a year latter on March 1, 1934. So even though the law was placed on the books, it lay dormant for a year during which time nothing changed in the lives of citizens in traveling upon the roads thereby suppressing any immediate objections to it. And when it was enacted, history shows it was loosely enforced. The continued enforcement of the license is seen today to include everything from roadblocks to requiring mandatory seatbelts and insurance. Furthermore, the gradual evolution and adoption of examinations fourteen years after the license law was enacted was necessary because the people had to first be lulled into the idea that the State could license their right to travel. Where these “examinations” were required at the same time the driver’s license was required, along with its heavy and strict enforcement, mandatory seatbelt, mandatory insurance, etc., the people would then have seen it as an obvious and sudden usurpation of an inherent right and rebelled against it. Throughout our history we have been forewarned of such gradual encroachments upon our rights:

I believe there are more instances of the abridgment of freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachment of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.—-James Madison.

Illegitimate and constitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property should be liberally construed.* * *It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Boyd v. United States (1886), 116 U.S. 616, 635; Ex parte Rhodes, 202 Ala. 68, 71.

The State has gradually convinced the citizenry that the exercise of their inalienable and constitutional right to liberty and to freely travel is an unlawful act, by gradually convincing them that a license is first required before the liberty and right to travel can be exercised. It thus would seem the primary purpose to which the driver’s license serves is that of legal control of a right, identification, and revenue, and not one of public safety.

Thus, the Defendant does and cannot constitutionally come under the purview of the “driver’s licensing” statute.

The nature of a driver’s license is such that it also infringes upon and prohibits the use of one’s property (i.e. automobile/pick-up vehicle). Appellant has never waived his rights, knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily to the use of his automobile via application of the driver’s license. The State of Connecticut driver’s license statute disallows a citizen to use his property (an automobile) and where he does use it, that property is taken away (towed and/or compounded). Such statutes cannot be held as being valid against an American and/or citizen.

Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right. Therefore a law which forbids the use of a certain kind of property, strips it of an essential attribute and in actual result proscribes its ownership.* * * Since the right of the citizen to use his property as he choose so long as he harms nobody, is an inherent and constitutional right, the police power cannot be invoked for the abridgment of a particular use of private property, unless such use reasonably endangers or threatens the public health, the public safety, the public comfort or welfare. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S. W. 513, 514-15.

So far as such use of one’s property may be had without injury to others it is a lawful use which cannot be absolutely prohibited by the legislative department under the guise of the exercise. In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 612 (1905).

To date, this legislative court/tribunal acting with an administrator designated from de facto Legislation (rule makers for the corporate State), under bankruptcy supplies no evidence that the Defendant has caused any injury or property damage in the use of his property traveling upon the public roads. The “driver’s license” can and would allow the Defendant’s property to be abridged by forbidding him to use that property until he becomes licensed.

An automobile is not dangerous per se. Thus, rule and legal principles (such as a license prohibiting its use), which are applicable to those things required “extraordinary care in the use and control,” are not applicable to automobiles/pick-up vehicles. This court/tribunal has given no justification for prohibiting the Defendant the use of his property.

Conclusions applicable to Defendant’s use of the roads in common tenancy

The ill-trained Gestapo police here are mistaken about the law. They and the courts here are both short-sighted with regard to the right to use the roads.

1. Right to Travel. You all swore to uphold the constitution.

2. Common Tenancy of the public road. No license is required for a tenant in common to use the common property.

3. Legislature has no right to dissolve our tenancy. Traveling on the roads in California (except the toll roads) has always been free to all. The legislature has no authority to take away that right.

C. The driver’s license creates a distinction in rights of citizens using the public roads for travel. All citizens are to have equal rights in the use of the roads for ordinary travel and none are to have superior rights (i.e. bicyclists) over another (i.e. automobilists/pick-up vehicles). The driver’s license imposes a burden and restriction on Americans and/or citizens traveling by automobiles/pick-up vehicles that does not exist on other travelers. D. The driver’s license confers a statutory right, that being the right to travel on the public roads with an automobile/pick-up vehicle, which the Appellant already possess an inalienable, constitutional and vested right. Thus the driver’s license is nugatory and meaningless against the Appellant.

The driver’s license gives to the licensor the power to prohibit and preclude the Defendant’s right to use the public roads for travel. This is an extraordinary measure that could only be used on this engaged in commercial travel.

The driver’s license makes the Defendant’s constitutional liberty and right of locomotion subordinate to the police powers. However, the police power can never transcend constitutional rights but rather is always subordinate to them since these rights are part of the supreme law of this State.

Other constitutional rights of the Defendant are subject to be limited or forced to be waived by any terms or rules under such licensing. This would constitute an “unreasonable” exercise of police powers.

The driver’s license, where applied to the Defendant, would require him to surrender and transfer his inalienable right of liberty and locomotion to this State in lieu of the license (i.e. statutory privilege) which is constitutionally impossible.

A word about administrative law and statutes. In California, the meaning of statutes has been diluted. Subject matter which might better be relegated to regulations and been elevated to the status of statute. While in practical effect regulations may be called little laws they are at most but off-spring of statutes. See United States v. Jones, 345 U.S. 377, 73 S.Ct. 759, 97 L ED.. 1108. The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only to together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other. See U.S. v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 80 S.Ct. 459

These powers are utilized in the Superior courts throughout California and nearly all the states, not just as a resource for income (taking of property from the people traveling in Connecticut, but also in the same way the Jews in Nazi Germany were identified with a tattoo on the arm for control.

The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.@ Miller v U.S., 230 F.2d 488, 489.

______________________

Defendant pro se

I, (print name)_______________, declare the following under penalty of perjury. I served this demurrer on the district attorney by hand delivering it to the receptionist at his office on the 3rd floor of the court house at 800 S. Victoria, Ventura CA 93003 on (date)________________.

Signed _____________________ Date _________________

About Paul John Hansen

3 responses to right to travel, california case win.

Didn’t the US Supreme court rule that a horse and buggy was the standard mode of travel in the USA? Something like 2001? I heard that they did, but can’t find it. If anyone know the citation, I would like to know it.

Been using an automobile for a while without a license in California (Ojai Ca.) Been pulled over and they call them “courtesy pull overs” to see how you’re doing. Some cops are hard asses and will threaten to take you out, but a phone call to the station is all it takes to remedy this. Doesn’t work all the time though, but each time I’m released, I’m back to square one. No fines, no charges, they do it to give you a hard time.

Listen folks, if you really want your right to travel, call up your county police department and make your demand. It’s not hard at all. First thing’s first, if you don’t have a license yet, you’re in luck. It’s after you get a license that makes it hard because you have to quit/unscribe and that is tedious. If you’re a minor, think about setting a court date before ever applying for a license.

A licensed is not an issue, when approached you should be able to go to the rear of your car and point to the sign that reads “Not For Hire” (can be attached under your state plate if you like.). If you have no state plate it works the same. If they make a fuss about you having a state plate, up dated or not, just remind them they lack authority because I am now “Not For Hire”. Never give state license, registration, or proof of insurance, this is a presentment to them that you are for hire at that moment. Read all my “Travel” issues at pauljjhansen.com and freeinhabitant.info.

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Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1:

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to travel from one state to another under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 1 Footnote See, e.g. , Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870) ( “[The Privileges and Immunities] clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union . . . .” ); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868) (stating that the Privileges and Immunities Clause includes “the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them” ), overruled on other grounds by United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) ; see generally United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762–67 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (surveying cases). as well as other constitutional provisions. 2 Footnote See Guest , 383 U.S. at 759 ( “Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right exists.” ). For example, the Court held that a state could not constitutionally limit access to medical care to its own residents, and deny access to nonresidents, without interfering with the right to travel. 3 Footnote Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) , abrogated on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org. , No. 19-1393 (U.S. June 24, 2022) .

In Saenz v. Roe , the Court characterized the constitutional “right to travel” as having “at least three different components” :

It protects [1] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, [2] the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, [3] for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State. 4 Footnote 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (numbering added).

While the Court did not expressly identify the constitutional basis of the first component, it noted that the Articles of Confederation’s privileges and immunities clause explicitly protected the “free ingress and regress to and from any other State.” 5 Footnote Id. at 501 (citing Articles of Confederation of 1781 art. IV, § 1) . As for the second component of the right to travel, the Court found it to be “expressly protected by the text of the Constitution” through the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 6 Footnote Id. at 501–502 . Saenz connected the third component of the right to travel to the Fourteenth Amendment ’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. 7 Footnote Id. at 502–03 (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ). The Commerce Clause is another potential textual basis for the right to travel. See Guest , 383 U.S. at 758 (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941) ).

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Right To Travel

Despite actions of police and local courts, higher courts have ruled that american citizens have a right to travel without state permits.

The laws sometimes sleep, but never die.

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Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)

The right to travel prevents states from imposing durational residency requirements that withhold the privileges and immunities of a state's citizens from people who have newly arrived in that state. Strict scrutiny and strict liability apply.

California required that people who had newly arrived in the state could not receive a greater amount of welfare benefits during their first year of residence than the amount that they had received in the state where they had lived before. Saenz and other California welfare recipients in this position argued that this law violated their right to travel, and they succeeded in the trial court. Soon afterward, Congress gave states the authority to apply the welfare benefits rules of another state if the benefits recipients had spent less than 12 months in the new state. Once this Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 had been passed, the state of California appealed the judgment in favor of Saenz. It argued that rational basis review was appropriate for a constitutional challenge to its welfare benefits law and that it had a legitimate interest in saving over $10 million of its funds per year.

• John Paul Stevens (Author)
• Sandra Day O'Connor
• Antonin Scalia
• Anthony M. Kennedy
• David H. Souter
• Ruth Bader Ginsburg
• Stephen G. Breyer

This type of law implicates the right to travel, which is one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. As a result, strict scrutiny rather than rational basis or intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of review. As established by the Slaughter-House Cases (1872), the textual source for the right to travel may be found in the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which ensures that new citizens of a state have the same privileges and immunities as long-standing citizens of the state. All of the citizens of the United States are protected under this clause through their federal citizenship, and states must establish a compelling interest to justify restricting the right to travel. They also must show that they have chosen a narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest. The California law is a penalty based on a discriminatory distinction between new and long-standing citizens. There appears to be no compelling interest that justifies it, since it is unclear that people move to this state to take advantage of its generous welfare benefits.

• William Hubbs Rehnquist (Author)
• Clarence Thomas

The Privileges or Immunities Clause should be discarded as a valid textual basis for any fundamental right. It has been used only once before in the history of the Court, and that decision was subsequently overruled. Rational basis is the appropriate standard of review, and this law meets its requirements.

• Clarence Thomas (Author)
• William Hubbs Rehnquist

The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment would not have attached this meaning to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It was not intended to embrace all public benefits otherwise established by state laws.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause has very little practical significance, and the right to travel is perhaps the only significant right that is held to arise from this provision rather than the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.

OCTOBER TERM, 1998

SAENZ, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ET AL. v. ROE ET AL., ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-97. Argued January 13, 1999-Decided May 17, 1999

California, which has the sixth highest welfare benefit levels in the country, sought to amend its Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in 1992 by limiting new residents, for the first year they live in the State, to the benefits they would have received in the State of their prior residence. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 11450.03. Although the Secretary of Health and Human Services approved the change-a requirement for it to go into effect-the Federal District Court enjoined its implementation, finding that, under Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , and Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55 , it penalized "the decision of new residents to migrate to [California] and be treated [equally] with existing residents," Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 521. After the Ninth Circuit invalidated the Secretary's approval of § 11450.03 in a separate proceeding, this Court ordered Green to be dismissed. The provision thus remained inoperative until after Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). PRWORA expressly authorizes any State receiving a TANF grant to pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF program to residents who have lived in the State for less than 12 months. Since the Secretary no longer needed to approve § 11450.03, California announced that enforcement would begin on April 1, 1997. On that date, respondents filed this class action, challenging the constitutionality of § 11450.03's durational residency requirement and PRWORA's approval of that requirement. In issuing a preliminary injunction, the District Court found that PRWORA's existence did not affect its analysis in Green. Without reaching the merits, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction.

1. Section 11450.03 violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Pp.498-507.

(a) In assessing laws denying welfare benefits to newly arrived residents, this Court held in Shapiro that a State cannot enact durational residency requirements in order to inhibit the migration of needy persons into the State, and that a classification that has the effect of imposing a penalty on the right to travel violates the Equal Protection Clause absent a compelling governmental interest. Pp. 498-500.

(b) The right to travel embraces three different components: the right to enter and leave another State; the right to be treated as a welcome visitor while temporarily present in another State; and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State. Pp. 500-502.

(c) The right of newly arrived citizens to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of their new State-the third aspect of the right to travel-is at issue here. That right is protected by the new arrival's status as both a state citizen and a United States citizen, and it is plainly identified in the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, see Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 80. That newly arrived citizens have both state and federal capacities adds special force to their claim that they have the same rights as others who share their citizenship. Pp. 502-504.

(d) Since the right to travel embraces a citizen's right to be treated equally in her new State of residence, a discriminatory classification is itself a penalty. California's classifications are defined entirely by the period of residency and the location of the disfavored class members' prior residences. Within the category of new residents, those who lived in another country or in a State that had higher benefits than California are treated like lifetime residents; and within the broad subcategory of new arrivals who are treated less favorably, there are 45 smaller classes whose benefit levels are determined by the law of their former States. California's legitimate interest in saving money does not justify this discriminatory scheme. The Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause expressly equates citizenship with residence, Zobel, 457 U. S., at 69, and does not tolerate a hierarchy of subclasses of similarly situated citizens based on the location of their prior residences. Pp.504-507.

2. PRWORA's approval of durational residency requirements does not resuscitate § 11450.03. This Court has consistently held that Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the protection afforded to a citizen by that Amendment's Citizenship Clause limits the powers of the National Government as well as the States. Congress' Article I powers to legislate are limited not only by the scope of the Framers' affirmative delegation, but also by the principle that the powers may not be exercised in a way that violates

491 Full Text of Opinion

• Opinions & Dissents

"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; .... " 16

"The states have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional

right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right. He is not bound to cringe to any superior, or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and privileges enjoyed by other citizens." Id., at 112-113.

"But we need not rest on the particular facts of these cases. Appellants' reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its citizens." 394 U. S., at 632-633.

"Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress broad power indeed to enforce the command of the amendment and 'to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion .... ' Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 , 346 (1880). Congress' power under § 5, however, 'is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.' Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 651, n. 10 (1966). Although we give deference to congressional decisions and classifications, neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 ,210 (1977); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 , 29 (1968)." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 , 732-733 (1982).

"We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. And a tax imposed by a State for entering its territories or harbours is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the citizens of other States as members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain. Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord and mutual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it." Id., at 492.

"We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; ... and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; ... the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities." Id., at 551-552.

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Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

Contagion and the Right to Travel

• Anthony Michael Kreis

Not since 1918 has the United States faced the kind of wide-scale public health crisis that Americans face today. The novel coronavirus pandemic of 2020 jeopardizes multiple millions of Americans’ lives, especially the elderly and immunocompromised. It also stands to cripple the American economy with the real prospect of the nation plunging into a depression. The virus itself is more easily transmitted than other seasonal diseases like the flu. Each non-isolated case of novel coronavirus will infect 2 to 2.5 additional people compared to the flu, where each additional case will infect 1.3 other people on average. Moreover, it is more deadly than the flu. As I write, nearly 85,000 Americans have been infected, and over 1,000 lives have been lost to the pandemic. These numbers will surely grow as the challenges to respond to the crisis mounts. Public health resources are strained, and the testing capacity of the United States lags behind other nations. 

Public health experts and government officials face a stark choice: swift crackdowns on private movement or the possibility of mass mortality. To “flatten the curve,” i.e., slow the exponential growth of new infections and avoid overwhelming the healthcare system, governors and mayors have mandated social distancing and instituted stay-at-home orders. And while the pandemic has touched every state in the nation, certain states like New York , New Jersey , and Washington have acute outbreaks. In response, some governors have instituted de facto travel bans for short-term visitors. The governors in Alaska and Hawaii issued mandatory self-quarantine periods for all persons entering either state for 14 days. Travelers whose final destinations are Florida or Texas coming from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut must quarantine for 14 days, as must persons traveling from New Orleans to Texas. Rhode Island has instituted a similar policy directed at New Yorkers, including police stops of non-commercial vehicles entering the state with New York license plates, that has come under fire from the state American Civil Liberties Union chapter. 

These gubernatorial actions raise essential questions about states’ power to restrict the constitutional right to interstate travel that is grounded in dormant commerce clause doctrine. Observers are likely to initially turn to the foundational 1941 Supreme Court decision on the freedom of movement, Edwards v. California , for guidance because it captures restrictions on the movement of persons in a way no other case does. But, the history behind Edwards makes it incongruous with the dynamics underlying today’s contemporary crisis.

In Edwards , Fred Edwards was prosecuted under California’s anti-migrant law after he left his home in California to retrieve his destitute, pregnant sister and brother-in-law from Texas. Edwards was convicted of violating the state law banning persons from transporting “any indigent person who is not a resident” to California. The Supreme Court struck down the California statute as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Edwards rejected nearly a century-old precedent that blessed states’ police power to take “precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts.” In this sense, Edwards ’ freedom of movement principle is less helpful because it is best read as a rejection of economic protectionism in the form of a public charge rule informed by the animus that equated poverty with immorality. It was not a balancing of free movement and public health.

Rather, case law resolving the tension between public health and the movement of goods under the Commerce Clause long predated Edwards. Two livestock quarantine cases that date back to the late nineteenth century enforce states’ prerogative to establish rules to protect the public welfare against contagion, notwithstanding incidental burdens on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court blessed Colorado’s rule restricting the movement of cattle and horses into the state south of the state line and Kansas’ requirement that cattle originating from any place south of Kansas be immediately slaughtered or inspected. States cannot block interstate exchange in the name of economic protectionism but retain the right to impose restrictions, particularly when time is of the essence. However, even where there is a public health need to restrict the transport of products is demonstrated, states nonetheless retain an obligation to serve that public health by seeking out nondiscriminatory alternatives. 

The quarantined goods cases are about the shuffling of commercial products across state lines, but the Supreme Court took the same approach to state officials’ purported work to curb the transmission of communicable disease. In 1898, a French passenger ship, Britannia , sailed from Marseilles to Palermo, Italy with 408 passengers and cargo to New Orleans. The passengers included both foreign nationals and American citizens. When Britannia arrived outside New Orleans at a designated quarantine station, the ship’s passengers and merchandise were inspected, deemed free of disease, and given permission to proceed upriver. But, New Orleans established an absolute quarantine to help fight a yellow fever outbreak, first discovered in mid-September 1898.  New Orleanians’ fears were not unfounded— the city’s yellow fever epidemic, which began the year before, already claimed nearly 300 lives in 1897. When the ship arrived at New Orleans shortly after the first reported case, the city blocked Britannia’s passengers from disembarking, citing the newly instituted order that banned the “bodies of people, immigrants, soldiers, or others” from entering the city. 

The Supreme Court upheld the power of Louisiana officials to block the Britannia in  Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health . The Court held that states’ power to order quarantine laws “is beyond question” and that the New Orleans order met constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause “although their operation affects interstate or foreign commerce, is not an open question.” The Court noted that in the absence of a federally enacted law to preempt state and local quarantine regulations affecting interstate commerce, regulations like New Orleans’ are permissible. Without a contrary federal command, the Supreme Court allowed a draconian measure to block healthy persons’ admission to the city and limit the potential for new vectors. 

The controversy over the right to interstate travel during a national public health crisis should not be conflated with a parallel debate about the constitutional due process constraints that exist or should exist to limit state quarantine and isolation powers generally. As for the freedom of movement, this moment should prompt a reconsideration of whether the Commerce Clause should protect the right to travel or if it is derived elsewhere in the Constitution. That worthy query notwithstanding, the right to travel cases and the livestock quarantine cases provide ample authority backing states’ power to limit interstate travel by restrictions placed on non-residents’ intrastate mobility. Of course, this power is not totally unfettered and there is room for courts to strike down quarantine orders under federal constitutional law that are arbitrary or overbroad.

Such was the case in Jew Ho v. Williamson where San Francisco officials imposed a racially discriminatory quarantine and In Re Smith where Brooklyn officials mandated isolation for anyone who refused a smallpox vaccine even though there was no basis to suspect they had been infected or exposed to the disease. Importantly, this history cautions Americans against using the government to perpetuate unscientific approaches to combat communicable disease and a reminder that invidious discrimination in the name of public health has a long history in the United States. 

Here, the permissibility of public health orders from state officials restricting the movement of interstate travelers in a pandemic should be weighed against the characteristics of the disease, the reasonability of the covered jurisdiction(s), and the relative treatment of nonresidents versus residents. Opponents of the state executive orders are unlikely to meet the high bar necessary to challenge state officials’ efforts to block new seeds of coronavirus contagion. Unlike other outbreaks, there is no clearly established standard for when individuals are infectious. So unless or until states can rapidly test asymptomatic individuals, it is unlikely that any court would be willing to question state officials’ restrictions on intrastate travel by individuals coming from designated jurisdictions. More problematic, perhaps, might be the breadth of the jurisdictions ordered for quarantine. Even still, the likelihood of judicial intervention in the middle of a global public health crisis where there is at least a plausible rationale for the order’s geographic scope is near zero. Except for a total ban on non-residents from identified jurisdictions entering a state that grossly mistreats non-residents over residents, it is hard to fathom any muscular judicial intervention.

The nation finds itself in a historic moment that will change how Americans live for the foreseeable future and will leave an indelible mark on American society. Governors and state public health officers will use every arrow in their quiver to stem the spread of the novel coronavirus. That much is clear. Some of these actions will inevitably raise honest concerns about civil liberties, and Americans should endeavor to debate the wisdom of government policy even amid a crisis to hold government actors accountable and protect constitutional values. However, the simple reality is this: federal courts will not enjoin temporary measures that are facially calculated to save lives.

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The Right to Travel

The right to travel in the United States is a little-discussed right given by the Constitution under the 5th Amendment. Under the 5th Amendment, the right to travel is considered part the “liberty” that US citizens cannot be deprived with without due process.

Author: Brad Nakase, Attorney

It stems from the right to freedom of movement and allows the following “travel”:

• The right to move freely between states
• The right to privileges and immunities enjoyed by a citizen of another state when visiting that state
• The right to enjoy the benefits and rights of a citizen in a state as soon as you move to that state.

The right to travel is a constitutional right and gives all American citizens and legal residents the right to move between states. It also allows all American citizens to enter the country and to leave the country at any time. The right to travel may have restrictions imposed in extreme circumstances, such as risk to public health. In the past, the government has legally implemented a travel ban for reasons of national security and public health and safety. The government would need to show that there is a reasonable threat to the public to restrict the right to travel. The right to travel appears in Article IV Section 2 of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution.

In contrast to the explicit reference in the Articles of Confederation to the right of the people to move to and from other states, neither the United States Constitution nor the California Constitution mentions the right to travel. Despite the absence of an express guarantee, state and federal courts have recognized the right to travel as a fundamental right entitled to constitutional protection. The right to intrastate travel (which includes intramunicipal travel) is a basic human right protected by the United States and California Constitutions as a whole. Such a right is implicit in the concept of a democratic society and is one of the attributes of personal liberty under common law.

The right to travel, or right of migration, now is seen as an aspect of personal liberty which, when united with the right to travel, requires that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.

Do I Need to Have a Driver’s License When Exercising My Right to Travel?

Not always. The right of an individual to operate a private automobile cannot be equated with the fundamental constitutional right of an individual to travel. The right to operate motor vehicles in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare.

If you are driving, then you always need to carry a driver’s license while operating a vehicle. Therefore, if you are moving between states by driving, you will need to have your license. However, the driver’s license is not necessary to the right to travel. Some other forms of transportation do require ID to prove you are the person supposed to be travelling.

The impact of California’s driver’s license requirement on the right to travel is incidental. The requirement is a valid exercise of the state’s police power because the requirement is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in safeguarding the health and safety of its citizens. To obtain a driver’s license, individuals must pass a test showing their knowledge of the traffic laws and their physical ability to control an automobile or truck. By granting licenses only to people who have passed the test, California has increased the safety of its highways and streets. Halajian v. D & B Towing, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1.

Bill of Rights, Fundamental Rights

The right to freedom of travel is constitutionally protected. Even so, California state courts have found a violation of the constitutional right of intrastate travel only when there is a direct restriction on the right to travel, such as where a parent is ordered to move to another county as a condition of continued custody of a child. Otherwise lawful ordinances that have an indirect or incidental impact on the right to travel and do not discriminate among classes of persons by penalizing the exercise of the right to travel are not constitutionally impermissible. Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41.

Right to Travel Not Absolute and May Be Limited

The right of free movement is not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the public interest. As a result, conditions that negatively affect the right to travel are not automatically invalid. Only statutes, rules, or regulations that unreasonably burden or restrict the right to travel are constitutionally impermissible. Halajian v. D & B Towing, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1.

Right to Travel After Criminal Conviction

Following a defendant’s conviction of a crime, the sentencing court may choose among a variety of dispositional options. One option is to release the offender on probation. Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation. A grant of probation is qualitatively different from such traditional forms of punishment as fines or imprisonment. Probation is neither punishment, Pen. Code, § 15, nor a criminal judgment, Pen. Code, § 1445. Instead, courts deem probation an act of clemency in lieu of punishment, and its primary purpose is rehabilitative in nature. Accordingly, a grant of probation is an act of grace or clemency, and an offender has no right or privilege to be granted such release. Stated differently, probation is not a right, but a privilege. People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 5th 398.

Probation Condition Right to Travel

When an offender chooses probation, thereby avoiding incarceration, state law authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such release that are “fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and … for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” Accordingly, we have recognized a sentencing court has “broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120 at p. 1120.) But such discretion is not unlimited: “[A] condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute,” and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must be “‘reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’” (Id. at p. 1121.) “If the defendant finds the conditions of probation more onerous than the sentence he would otherwise face, he may refuse probation” (People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 32 at p. 32) and simply “choose to serve the sentence” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.

Right to Intrastate Travel

The right of intrastate travel has been recognized as a basic human right protected by Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 24. And the United States Supreme Court has observed that the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const., 14th Amend. This right to remove from one place to another according to inclination has been expressly identified as an attribute of personal liberty protected by the Constitution. The right to intrastate travel is based on its necessity for daily life. The right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways—perhaps more than any other right secured by substantive due process—is an everyday right, a right people depend on to carry out daily life activities. It is, at its core, a right of function. People v. Padilla-Martel.

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Northern California hit with snow and rain, affecting travel in the Sierra

PLACER COUNTY, Calif. (NBC, KYMA/KECY) - Rain and snow is making travel in the Sierra difficult in some parts just as people are hitting the road for the holiday weekend.

Another snowstorm hit the Sierra, creating dangerous road conditions for travelers on Interstate 80 (I-80).

"We saw some chain control signs but we weren't expecting this," said Curtis Tran, a driver.

"Not at all actually, I'm really surprised like what's going on," said Yash Choudhary, another driver.

Came prepared

For more than an hour, Caltrans stopped traffic at Cisco Grove due to a crash, delaying hundreds of drivers, like Tran and his family.

"We are headed to Mountain Rose, we got an Airbnb, and we are just trying to get there, but we got stopped," Tran shared.

His kids took the opportunity to enjoy the snow.

Chains or snow tires were also required for travelers. Tran says he was aware of the conditions and came prepared.

"We have snow chains, snow socks...We are ready to go," Tran spoke.

Icy roads and low visibility

The heavy snow fall caused icy roads and low visibility, and Caltrans vehicles constantly working to maintain the roads.

"Once we start seeing accumulation of snow on the roads, the plow are gonna be out there removing it to the shoulder keeping the highway clear and open," said Jeremy Linder, Caltrans spokesperson.

Caltrans says the best thing to do is to avoid travel, but for those headed to the Sierra, the advice is drive slow and safely.

"Definitely come prepared, pack food, water, be prepared to wait a long time," Tran expressed.

For the Tran family, it's worth the wait.

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A Total Solar Eclipse Is Coming. Here’s What You Need to Know.

These are answers to common questions about the April 8 eclipse, and we’re offering you a place to pose more of them.

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By Katrina Miller

On April 8, North America will experience its second total solar eclipse in seven years. The moon will glide over the surface of our sun, casting a shadow over a swath of Earth below. Along this path, the world will turn dark as night.

Skywatchers in Mexico will be the first to see the eclipse on the mainland. From there, the show will slide north, entering the United States through Texas, then proceeding northeast before concluding for most people off the coast of Canada.

Why eclipses happen is simple: the moon comes between us and the sun. But they are also complicated. So if you’ve forgotten all of your eclipse facts, tips and how-to’s since 2017, we’re here to explain it for you.

But before we dive in, there is one thing to know that is more important than anything else: It is never safe to look directly at the sun during an eclipse (except for the few moments when the moon has fully obscured its surface). At all other times, watch the event through protective eye equipment . Read on to learn about how to watch an eclipse safely.

What is a total solar eclipse?

A solar eclipse occurs when the moon orients itself between Earth and the sun, shielding the solar surface from our view.

In cosmic terms, it is unusual that this happens: the moon is about 400 times smaller than the sun, but it is about 400 times closer to us. That means that when these two celestial bodies are aligned, they appear to be the same size in the sky.

What other types of eclipses are there?

Annular solar eclipses occur when the moon is farther from Earth and appears too small to completely shield the sun’s surface. Instead, the outer part of the solar disk remains uncovered — a “ring of fire” in the sky.

Partial solar eclipses happen when Earth, the moon and the sun are imperfectly aligned. The moon only obscures a chunk of the sun. There will be two in 2025.

Earth can also get between the moon and the sun, creating a lunar eclipse. This can be observed once or twice a year .

How dark will it be during the eclipse?

In any given place along the eclipse path , the event will last around two hours or more.

The event will commence with a partial solar eclipse, as the moon takes a small bite out of the sun’s edge, then consumes more and more of its surface. According to NASA , this can last anywhere from 70 to 80 minutes.

The phase of the eclipse where the moon has completely blocked the sun’s surface is called totality. This is the only time the event can be viewed with the naked eye.

The length of totality varies by location. In April, some places will experience this phase for more than four minutes; others, for only one to two minutes.

During totality, the sky will get dark as night and the temperature will drop. Wispy white strings of light from the sun’s outer atmosphere, or corona, will suddenly be visible. Lucky viewers may even spot a thin, reddish-pink circle around the edge of the moon. That’s the chromosphere, an atmospheric layer below the sun’s corona. Its color comes from the presence of hydrogen throughout the layer.

After totality, the sun will slowly peek out from behind the moon again — another partial eclipse that will last the same amount of time as the first one. The moon will recede until the sun is back to normal brightness in our sky.

How can I watch the solar eclipse safely?

In general, avoid looking directly at the sun without special equipment to protect your eyes. Inexpensive options for watching the eclipse include paper solar viewers and glasses. If you are using equipment purchased for a past solar eclipse, make sure to inspect it. Toss anything with scratches or other signs of damage.

According to NASA , it is not safe to look at the sun through any optical device while using paper glasses or viewers. To watch the eclipse through cameras, binoculars or telescopes, buy a special solar filter.

The only time you can view a solar eclipse with the naked eye is during the moments of totality. Once the moon begins to reveal the surface of the sun again, return to watching the event through protective equipment to avoid injury.

What happens if I look at the eclipse without protection?

In general, staring directly at the sun, even for a few seconds, can cause permanent damage to your eyes . This can range from blurry or distorted vision to something even more serious, like blind spots. Because there are no pain receptors in the retina, you won’t feel it while it’s happening.

The same is true during an eclipse — except during the brief moments of totality, when the moon has hidden the face of the sun. At all other times, use protective eye equipment to view the event.

What do I do if I can’t find eclipse glasses?

If it’s too late to get glasses or viewers, there’s always a do-it-yourself option: a pinhole camera to indirectly experience the eclipse. You can create one using cardstock , a cardboard box , a kitchen strainer or even your fingers . These designs project an image of the eclipse onto the ground or some other surface that is safe to look at.

Where are the best places to watch the eclipse?

The total eclipse will sweep across large portions of Mexico, the United States and eastern Canada. For the most dramatic show, it’s best to experience the eclipse along the path of totality , which is where the moon will completely blot out the sun.

The Path of the Eclipse

On April 8, a total solar eclipse will cross North America from Mazatlán, Mexico, to the Newfoundland coast near Gander, Canada. Viewers outside the path of the total eclipse will see a partial eclipse, if the sky is clear .

Percentage of

the sun obscured

during the eclipse

Indianapolis

Little Rock

San Antonio

Viewers near Mazatlán, a beach town on the Pacific shoreline of Mexico, will be the first place to experience totality on North America’s mainland. Various sites in Mexico along the eclipse’s path will experience the longest duration of totality — as long as four minutes and 29 seconds.

Cities across the United States, including Dallas, Indianapolis and Cleveland, will most likely be hot spots for the upcoming eclipse. Other notable locations include Carbondale, Ill., which also saw totality during the solar eclipse in 2017; small towns west of Austin, Texas, which are projected to have some of the best weather in the country along the eclipse path; and Niagara Falls, if the skies are clear. Six provinces of Canada are in the path of totality, but many of them have a very cloudy outlook.

When does the eclipse begin and end?

The show begins at dawn, thousands of miles southwest of the Pacific shore of Mexico. The moon starts to conceal the sun near Mazatlán at 9:51 a.m. local time. Viewers near Mazatlán will experience totality at 11:07 a.m. for four minutes and 20 seconds.

Then the moon’s shadow will swoop through Mexico, crossing over the Texas border at 1:10 p.m. Eastern time. Totality in the United States will start at 2:27 p.m. and end at 3:33 p.m. Eastern time.

Canadians will experience the solar eclipse in the afternoon for nearly three hours. The eclipse concludes beyond Canada’s boundaries when the sun sets over the Atlantic Ocean.

What time is the eclipse in New York, Texas, Illinois, Mexico, Canada and other locations?

If you’d like to look up when the eclipse starts, reaches its peak under totality and then ends, you can visit The Times’s interactive map , which will also give you the weather outlook for April 8 along the event’s path.

Below are the times in selected locations when the eclipse will begin totality.

How long will the eclipse last?

The duration of totality depends on how far a given location on Earth is from the moon. Places with the longest totality are closest to the moon and farther from the sun. The speed of the lunar shadow is slowest over spots with the longest totality.

In April, the longest period of totality will occur over Durango, a state in Mexico, for a total of four minutes and 29 seconds. Along the centerline, the location of shortest totality on land is on the eastern coast of Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada, for about two minutes and 54 seconds. But totality is even shorter along the edges of the total eclipse path; in some places, it lasts less than a minute.

How fast does the eclipse move?

Solar eclipses may seem to happen slowly, but the moon’s shadow is racing across the surface of Earth. Exact speeds vary by location. Eclipse calculators estimate the shadow will move between about 1,560 m.p.h. and 1,600 m.p.h. through Mexico, and more than 3,000 m.p.h. by the time it exits the United States. The eclipse will reach speeds exceeding 6,000 m.p.h. over the Atlantic Ocean.

When was the last total solar eclipse in the United States?

According to the American Astronomical Society , total solar eclipses happen once every year or so, but they can only be viewed along a narrow path on Earth’s surface. Many occur over water or other places that can be difficult to reach. A given location will experience totality once in about 400 years.

But some places get lucky: Carbondale, a college town in southern Illinois, saw the total solar eclipse in the United States on Aug. 21, 2017, and will experience another one this April. San Antonio experienced an annular eclipse last October, and is also in the path of totality for this year’s eclipse.

Do other planets experience solar eclipses?

Yes, any planet in our solar system with a moon can experience a solar eclipse. In February, a Martian rover captured Phobos , one of the red planet’s moons, transiting the sun.

The moons on other planets, though, appear either smaller or larger than the sun in the sky . Only Earth has a moon just the right size and at just the right distance to produce the unique effects of totality.

How will things on Earth change during the eclipse?

As the eclipse approaches its maximum phase, the air will get cooler, the sky will grow dimmer, shadows will sharpen and you might notice images of crescents — tiny projections of the eclipse — within them. Along the path of totality, the world will go dark while the moon inches toward perfect alignment with Earth and the sun.

Animals will also react to the solar eclipse. Bees stop buzzing , birds stop whistling and crickets begin chirping. Some pets may express confusion . Even plants are affected, scientists found after the solar eclipse in 2017 . They have diminished rates of photosynthesis and water loss similar to, though not as extreme as, what happens at night.

What’s the difference between experiencing a solar eclipse at 99 percent compared with a total eclipse?

Patricia Reiff, a physicist at Rice University who has traveled for 25 eclipses and counting, says that if you are in a place where you’d see a 99 percent partial eclipse, it’s worth safely traveling a little farther to experience a total eclipse.

“Ninety-nine percent is cool,” she said, but “totality is oh-my-God crazy.”

Even at 99 percent eclipse, the sky won’t darken — you won’t be able to see stars or planets. Changes in the temperature, wind and shadows won’t be as dramatic. And the moon won’t block out enough light for you to witness the sun’s corona.

What if I can’t get to the path of totality?

Viewers in locations away from the eclipse path will see the moon partially blot out the sun, though how perceptible the effects are depends on the site’s distance from the centerline. (The closer you are, the more remarkable it will be.) Still, it won’t be quite like experiencing the eclipse during totality.

Remember that you should always wear protective eye equipment while watching a partial eclipse.

If you can’t make it to the path of totality but still want to experience it, many organizations are providing live video streams of the eclipse, including NASA and Time and Date . The Exploratorium, a museum in San Francisco, will also offer a sonification of the eclipse and a broadcast in Spanish.

When is the next total solar eclipse?

If you’re willing to travel, the next total solar eclipse is on Aug. 12, 2026. People in parts of Greenland, Iceland, Portugal and Spain will experience the event.

But if you want to see an eclipse in the United States, you’ll have to wait a long time. While a total eclipse will graze parts of Alaska in 2033, the next one to reach the lower 48 states is on Aug. 22, 2044. That event crosses parts of Canada and ends in Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota.

For those willing to wait until 2045, the eclipse of Aug. 12 that year will start in California and travel east, exiting the country in Florida.

What have we learned from solar eclipses?

In the 1800s, a French astronomer discovered the element helium by studying the spectrum of sunlight emitted during an eclipse. These events also allowed the first scientific observations of coronal mass ejections — violent expulsions of plasma from the sun’s corona — which can cause power outages and communication disruptions on Earth. Scientists also confirmed Einstein’s theory of general relativity, which says that massive objects bend the fabric of space-time, during a solar eclipse in 1919.

And there is more to discover. This April, NASA plans to fly instruments on planes to capture images of the solar corona, and launch rockets to study how the drop in sunlight during an eclipse affects Earth’s atmosphere. A radio telescope in California will try to use the moon as a shield to measure emissions from individual sunspots .

The public is joining the fun, too. During the eclipse, a team of ham radio operators will beam signals across the country to study how solar disturbances can affect communications. Some people along the path of totality will record sounds from wildlife . Others will use their phones to snap pictures of the eclipse to help sketch out the shape of the solar disk .

An earlier version of this article referred imprecisely to eclipse on other worlds. Some appear larger than the sun in sky, they are not all partial eclipses.

How we handle corrections

Katrina Miller is a science reporting fellow for The Times. She recently earned her Ph.D. in particle physics from the University of Chicago. More about Katrina Miller

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Diddy's private jet tracked to caribbean island amid raids in u.s., diddy loveair private jet tracked amid raids down on caribbean island.

Diddy 's homes were raided in the U.S. to kick off the week -- but the guy's own private jet is miles away in a completely different nation ... although it's unclear if he's aboard himself.

TMZ has tracked Diddy's personal LoveAir LLC jet -- the well-known black Gulfstream 5 that Diddy has flaunted and flown for years now -- and it looks like the aircraft is currently on the ground in Antigua ... which is down in the Caribbean.

Based on the flight activity, viewed by TMZ, Diddy's jet has been up and down California between Sunday and Monday -- taking off from Sacramento Executive Airport Sunday evening around 5:30 PM PT and landing at Palm Springs Int'l Airport about an hour later.

An hour after that, around 7:30 PM PT, Diddy's jet took off from Palm Springs yet again and landed at Van Nuys Airport, which is in the L.A. area, about 30 minutes later around 8:00 PM PT. Around 9 AM PT Monday, the jet took off from Van Nuys airport and landed at some point in Antigua.

The plane is currently grounded there, although the flight data has yet to update and register him as having officially landed. In any case, it's definitely Diddy's jet ... no question.

The only thing that remains unanswered is whether Diddy is on the plane -- we don't have any evidence he is at this point ... and we also don't know what's happening on the scene.

As we reported ... two of Diddy's homes, in L.A. and MIami, were swarmed by federal law enforcement agencies Monday -- and armed officials stormed the properties, taking some people into custody ... including his sons Justin and King . Unclear if any arrests took place.

The raids are believed to have stemmed from accusations hurled at Diddy in multiple lawsuits -- which have touched on alleged human and sex trafficking, among other claims ... all of which he's vehemently denied.

We've reached out to Diddy's rep and lawyers ... so far, no word back.

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News & features, winter center, news / weather forecasts, problems to continue in southern california as easter rainstorm winds down.

Even as a major storm winds down on Easter Sunday over Southern California, problems from additional rain and runoff will continue. The storm has deposited heavy snow in the Sierra Nevada and Arizona mountains.

By Alex Sosnowski , AccuWeather senior meteorologist

Published Mar 29, 2024 8:52 AM PDT | Updated Mar 31, 2024 8:21 AM PDT

A powerful storm targeting the West Coast over Easter weekend will bring huge amounts of snow to mountain passes and drenching rain to much of California.

A slow-moving and potent storm will continue to grab Pacific Ocean moisture and fling it at Southern California in the form of gusty thunderstorms into Easter Sunday, and AccuWeather meteorologists warn that enough rain will fall to increase the risk of flash flooding, mudslides and other debris flows.

Rain totaling 1-3 inches fell across the greater Los Angeles and San Diego areas into Easter Sunday morning with rainfall of 5-7 inches on parts of the Transverse Ranges to the north of Los Angeles. While the worst of the rain is over, additional showers and thunderstorms into Easter Sunday evening can easily trigger localized flash flooding, mudslides and other debris flows on area roads.

The wet weather may lead to delays of the Major League Baseball game versus San Francisco in San Diego Sunday afternoon.

Forecasters urge motorists to allow extra time and be prepared to seek an alternative route.

Spotty thunderstorms will also pack a punch in parts of California, with the risk of some of the strongest storms bringing hail and strong wind gusts during the afternoon and evening. The setup with the storm system could produce a couple of waterspouts along the coast. Spotty downpours will also spill to the east of the Coast Ranges and onto the deserts in Southern California.

In the Southern California mountains, just rain is expected to fall on the major passes, including along Interstates 5 and 15. However, the ridges and peaks are likely due to snow showers continuing, leading to additional accumulation.

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Farther north, heavy snow that pounded the Sierra Nevada to end the week and kick off the weekend will wind down on Easter Sunday. Snowfall since late last week through Easter Sunday morning in the Sierra Nevada range from 6-18 inches with about of foot of snow falling on the Lake Tahoe and Donner Pass areas of California. Motorists can expect slow travel along I-80 through the Sierra Nevada.

Farther to the east, the storm was unloading heavy snow on the Arizona mountains. Close to a foot of snow is forecast to fall on the Flagstaff, Arizona, area with slow travel along I-17 and I-40 in the region.

From July 1 to March 30, Los Angeles International Airport has received 21.56 inches of rain, compared to a historical average of 11.33 inches or 190% of the historical average. Downtown Los Angeles has picked up 24.18 inches of rain since the start of July. Rainfall in the San Diego area has been well above the historical average as well, with 13.74 inches compared to 8.87 inches at the airport. Rainfall has been close to the historical average in San Francisco, with 18.47 inches of rain since July 1.

The weekend rain and Sierra Nevada snowstorm have bolstered reservoir levels and the snowpack from beyond last week's levels (below).

Because of the state of reservoirs and the amount of water locked up in the Sierra snow, AccuWeather experts do not anticipate water shortage problems in California into the spring of 2026, even if lean precipitation occurs during the upcoming winters of 2024-2025 and 2025-2026. There can still be episodes of soil drought and wildfire concerns due to dry vegetation.

AccuWeather meteorologists are tracking additional storms over the Pacific, which are likely to dip southward along the West Coast. At this time, the bulk of the rain from the storms may stay to the north of Los Angeles and San Diego while rounds of drenching rain (and thunderstorms) may affect San Francisco and Sacramento, as well as more snow for much of the Sierra Nevada, during the first week and weekend of April.

Energy from the storm in Southern California this past weekend will swing toward the central United States early this week and could initiate a significant amount of severe weather and tornadoes.

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More than 20 million under flood watches on West Coast as major storm hits

More than 20 million people along the West Coast are under flood watches due to a major storm this weekend bringing heavy rain and gusty winds.

A flood watch is in effect for much of Southern California through Sunday afternoon, with areas of flash flooding possible where the heaviest rain falls.

This area is in the process of seeing a widespread 1 to 3 inches of rain from San Francisco to San Diego, with up to 6 inches possible in the foothills of Southern California.

Most of the action is happening on Saturday morning, but there will be lingering showers during the day, with pockets of intense downpours.

Meanwhile, the mountains will be seeing an abundance of snow this weekend. Winter weather alerts are in effect across the mountains in California, stretching as far south as the U.S.-Mexico border.

As the storm moves east on Sunday it will bring heavy snow to parts of the Rockies where locally 6 to 12 inches are expected -- especially across parts of Wyoming and Colorado mountains where more than a foot is possible.

High wind alerts are also in effect for much of the Southwest, with nearly the entire state of Arizona under a wind advisory. Gusts may be topping 55 mph in some locations this weekend.

Storm to travel east

As this storm continues to slide east, it will bring a severe weather threat to a large portion of country early in the week.

A widespread area -- from Texas to Ohio -- could see a severe weather outbreak Monday afternoon and evening. The area with the highest tornado threat will be from Oklahoma through Missouri.

The severe weather outbreak continues into Tuesday as the threat moves east across the Ohio and Tennessee Valleys and into the Mid-Atlantic -- stretching from Birmingham to Baltimore.

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Turkey's resurgent opposition thumps Erdogan in pivotal local elections

It marked the worst defeat for Tayyip Erdogan and his AK Party in their more than two decades in power, and could signal a change in the country's divided political landscape. Erdogan called it a "turning point" in a post-midnight address.

Russian shelling killed at least three people in different regions of eastern Ukraine on the front of the more than two-year-old war against Russia, local officials said, and two more in Lviv region, far from the front lines.

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How to travel around the Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse in Baltimore: A look at the traffic impact and alternate routes

By Rohan Mattu

Updated on: March 29, 2024 / 5:01 AM EDT / CBS Baltimore

BALTIMORE -- The collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore early Tuesday  led to a major traffic impact for the region and cut off a major artery into and out of the port city. 

A bridge column was hit by a large container ship around 1:30 a.m., sending bridge workers and vehicles into the Patapsco River. A water search for six missing workers turned to a recovery effort Tuesday night.

Drivers are told to prepare for extra commuting time until further notice.

Alternate routes after Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse

Maryland transit authorities quickly put detours in place for those traveling through Dundalk or the Curtis Bay/Hawkins Point side of the bridge. The estimated 31,000 who travel the bridge every day will need to find a new route for the foreseeable future. 

The outer loop I-695 closure shifted to exit 1/Quarantine Road (past the Curtis Creek Drawbridge) to allow for enhanced local traffic access. 

The inner loop of I-695 remains closed at MD 157 (Peninsula Expressway). Additionally, the ramp from MD 157 to the inner loop of I-695 will be closed. 

Alternate routes are I-95 (Fort McHenry Tunnel) or I-895 (Baltimore Harbor Tunnel) for north/south routes. 

Commercial vehicles carrying materials that are prohibited in the tunnel crossings, including recreation vehicles carrying propane, should plan on using I-695 (Baltimore Beltway) between Essex and Glen Burnie. This will add significant driving time.    

Where is the Francis Scott Key Bridge? 

The Key Bridge crosses the Patapsco River, a key waterway that along with the Port of Baltimore serves as a hub for East Coast shipping. 

The bridge is the outermost of three toll crossings of Baltimore's Harbor and the final link in Interstate 695, known in the region as the Baltimore Beltway, which links Baltimore and Washington, D.C. 

The bridge was built after the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel reached capacity and experienced heavy congestion almost daily, according to the MDTA. 

Tractor-trailer inspections

Tractor-trailers that now have clearance to use the tunnels will need to be checked for hazardous materials, which are not permitted in tunnels, and that could further hold up traffic. 

The MDTA says vehicles carrying bottled propane gas over 10 pounds per container (maximum of 10 containers), bulk gasoline, explosives, significant amounts of radioactive materials, and other hazardous materials are prohibited from using the Fort McHenry Tunnel (I-95) or the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel (I-895).  

Any vehicles transporting hazardous materials should use the western section of I-695 around the tunnels, officials said. 

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Rohan Mattu is a digital producer at CBS News Baltimore. Rohan graduated from Towson University in 2020 with a degree in journalism and previously wrote for WDVM-TV in Hagerstown. He maintains WJZ's website and social media, which includes breaking news in everything from politics to sports.

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