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NATO leaders move to ‘Trump-proof’ the alliance in Washington

Fears that the former president could soon be back in the White House have NATO leaders looking to lock in support for Ukraine — and the alliance itself.

Former president Donald Trump doesn’t have a seat at the table as NATO leaders gather this week in Washington, but he might as well, as officials strategize about how to adapt the alliance for the possibility that its most senior leader may soon again be a skeptic.

Alliance policymakers have moved control of major elements of military aid to Ukraine away from U.S. command to the NATO umbrella. They appointed a new NATO secretary general who has a reputation as being especially agile with Trump’s unpredictable impulses toward the alliance. They are signing decade-long defense pledges with Ukraine to try to buffer military aid to Kyiv from the ups and downs of politics. And they are pushing up their defense spending , Trump’s single biggest anger point when it comes to NATO.

The gathered leaders on Wednesday agreed that they will support Ukraine “on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership” — wording that was subject to intense negotiation in recent weeks, with President Biden initially opposed to using the word “irreversible.”

Four nations also announced Wednesday that donated F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine will be operational later this summer . And alliance leaders called out China for being a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, its toughest language yet toward Beijing.

But for all the effort to strengthen the alliance, Trump’s shadow was casting a pall over Washington’s convention center, where the summit is being held. European leaders quietly wonder whether this is a goodbye to a U.S. president who hews to a transatlantic agenda — a bipartisan constant of U.S. foreign policy from World War II until Trump’s arrival in the White House in 2017.

“If we elect him a second time, then I think that’s, from the Europeans’ perspective, extraordinarily telling about our direction of travel in the United States,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, director of the transatlantic security program at the Center for a New American Security think tank. “And so it is Trump-proofing for the most immediate four years, but there is a growing worry that the United States will be less committed to Europe over the longer term.”

Few European policymakers say they believe that Trump would formally pull the United States from NATO. Congress recently passed legislation that binds the country to the alliance and would require a two-thirds vote in the Senate to withdraw.

But many fear Trump would bring a far more transactional approach to the alliance, and some take seriously his vow that he would look at whether they are meeting their defense spending commitments before deciding whether to come to their aid if they are attacked. How to handle Trump is dominating social conversations among NATO policymakers in Washington, along with the related obsession of whether Biden will drop his reelection effort.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Wednesday downplayed concerns about a second Trump presidency.

“The main criticism from former president Trump, but also from other U.S. presidents, has not primarily been against NATO, it has been against NATO allies not investing enough in NATO — and that has changed,” he told reporters. “The clear message has had an impact, because now allies are really stepping up.”

Asked whether European leaders are talking about Trump behind closed doors, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre told The Washington Post in an interview that “you will not believe me if I said no.”

While in Washington, many leaders are taking the opportunity to have quiet conversations on the side with potential Trump administration foreign policy officials. Keith Kellogg, the retired general who was then-Vice President Mike Pence’s national security adviser and continues to advise Trump, said last month that he had received 165 requests for briefings from foreign officials since November, and that he had granted 100 of them. Kellogg noted that he doesn’t speak in an official capacity for Trump or the Trump campaign.

Many international policymakers — including Ukrainian leaders, who have the most to lose — have been hedging their bets against the possibility that Trump could return to office. That was notable Tuesday in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s choice of venue to deliver a speech: the Reagan Institute, to a room of Republican luminaries and European diplomats.

Though he was careful not to comment directly about the U.S. election, Zelensky urged Biden to allow Ukraine to use U.S. long-range weaponry to strike military bases on Russian territory “and not to wait for November or any other event.”

Asked afterward by Fox News anchor Bret Baier how closely he was watching the U.S. election, he said, “I think sometimes closer than you, Bret,” to laughter from the crowd.

Ukrainian leaders said that they hoped to float above the tumultuous U.S. presidential race, mindful of their role in Trump’s first impeachment, in 2019. As president, Trump had delayed defense aid to Ukraine while pressing for evidence of Biden’s alleged corruption in Kyiv.

“We don’t have to fit every political process. We have to make sure that we secure our survival from political processes,” Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna said in an interview.

NATO policymakers have been deep in discussions for months about how to manage Trump’s revival. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Biden administration resisted a direct role for NATO in the provision of military aid to Kyiv, hoping to avoid Russian perceptions that the alliance was directly in battle with Moscow.

That reluctance has faded as Ukraine’s early heroics have been tempered by recent Russian battlefield gains. Meanwhile, Trump has surged in the polls and European concerns have grown. NATO policymakers agreed in the lead-up to the summit to establish a new NATO command that will take on many of the coordination roles that the Pentagon had provided.

Policymakers quietly acknowledge that Trump-proofing the alliance can only go so far — not least because Trump is not the only leader who has questioned NATO policy toward Ukraine and Russia. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico have also backed similar policies.

Some leaders say a Trump presidency could be fine for NATO, especially if it pushes lagging European countries to spend more on their defense.

“What I say to Europeans all the time is: ‘Stop freaking out about Trump. You’ve done this before, you did this for four years, and guess what? It actually wasn’t that bad for Europe,’” said Rachel Rizzo, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, in a briefing with reporters. “There was some tough rhetoric and tough language that ruffled feathers certainly. But the policies that Trump put in place toward Europe were not damaging toward NATO.”

That spend-more effort has been endorsed by right-wing leaders in Europe who share many of Trump’s migration-skeptic policies and yet are also pro-Ukraine, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Polish President Andrzej Duda.

Trump and Duda “are friends. They understand their values. They understand credibility when it comes to the security obligations also,” said Jacek Siewiera, the head of Duda’s National Security Bureau.

Italy’s ambassador to the United States, Mariangela Zappia, said NATO’s core interests can withstand elections.

“I believe the NATO summit will be in fact a confirmation of how democratic systems can choose different paths but in the end stand together on principles: in this case, that borders cannot be changed through aggression,” she said.

Pro-NATO policymakers hope to manage splintering policy visions under the leadership of the incoming secretary general, Mark Rutte, who as a long-serving Dutch prime minister met repeatedly with Trump and became known for his tact in managing sometimes tense interactions.

That would put him in the tradition of Stoltenberg, who earned plaudits during the Trump era for finding ways to work with him.

“He made a very conscious decision to not pick a fight with the U.S. president, not to challenge him publicly or privately, and never to be caught talking about him,” said Camille Grand, a former NATO assistant secretary general who is now a distinguished policy fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Oana Lungescu, NATO’s spokesperson between 2010 and 2023 and now a distinguished fellow at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, said Stoltenberg’s team workshopped a single, easy-to-read graph that showed increases in European defense spending. The alliance also looked for ways to credit Trump for pushing allies to spend more.

“The figures were real — it’s about how you shape it and how you use it [to show] that this is achieving results, that NATO is a win,” she said.

Rutte, 57, spent 14 years wrangling political coalitions as prime minister of the Netherlands and is seen as a skilled and savvy diplomat with a frank, pragmatic style. Those who have worked with him say he is deeply committed to the transatlantic relationship and will do whatever it takes to protect it.

“He deeply believes in the power and strength of U.S.-European cooperation as a force to project Western values on the global stage, and he will speak up for that,” said a senior European official who has worked closely with him for years, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive issues.

In a now-famous 2018 interaction in the Oval Office , Rutte pointedly pushed back when Trump, delivering off-the-cuff remarks about trade, suggested it would be “positive” if the U.S. and Europe failed to reach a deal.

“No,” Rutte said, as Trump continued to speak. “It’s not positive,” Rutte continued, smiling. “We have to work something out.”

Trump shook his hand and moved on.

“Europe needs to step up regardless of the outcome of the U.S. election,” Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström said in an interview. “We also have to take a greater responsibility for Ukraine, because Ukraine is in our backyard.”

Ellen Nakashima and Karen DeYoung contributed to this report.

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As Modi Meets Putin in Moscow, India Seeks to Chart Its Own Course

India is determined to keep its close ties to Russia despite pressure from the West. Russia sees the meeting as a chance to show it still has influential friends.

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By Anupreeta Das and Hari Kumar

Reporting from New Delhi

Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India arrived in Moscow on Monday to meet with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, a visit that signals the Indian leader’s determination to stick to his own diplomatic path even as the West continues to isolate Moscow over its war on Ukraine.

For Mr. Putin, Mr. Modi’s visit will be a way for Russia to show that the Kremlin continues to have a strong partnership with India, despite India’s deepening relationship with the United States. India’s purchases of discounted Russian petroleum have helped fill Russia’s coffers depleted by international sanctions over the war, and Russia has sought to cast India as a partner in reshaping the Western-dominated global order.

This is the first visit to Russia by Mr. Modi in five years. He arrived to a red-carpet welcome at Vnukovo International Airport in Moscow, where he was met by a Russian military band, as well the first deputy prime minister, Denis V. Manturov.

In a message posted on the social platform X after his arrival, Mr. Modi said he looked forward to deepening the “special and strategic partnership” between India and Russia, noting that stronger ties “will greatly benefit our people.”

Mr. Modi arrived on a day when Russia unleashed a brutal aerial bombardment against Ukraine, including a strike on that country’s largest children’s hospital , in Kyiv. The attack has drawn condemnation from the West, and could shine a harsh spotlight on India’s ties with Russia.

The South Asian nation became a major buyer of cheap Russian oil at a time when sanctions by Western countries limited what Russia could sell or charge for the product in international markets. India is building massive nuclear energy power plants with technical assistance from Russia. Russia is also India’s biggest supplier of arms, making the relationship key for India, which has long had to defend its borders against China.

The meeting in Moscow on Tuesday will coincide with the first day of a high-profile summit of NATO leaders in Washington. During the NATO meeting, Western allies are expected to announce additional air defense systems for Ukraine and offer assurances of the alliance’s long-term commitment to Kyiv’s security.

India and Russia are longstanding partners.

Speaking to reporters in New Delhi ahead of Mr. Modi’s trip, Indian officials said the summit between Mr. Modi and Mr. Putin was of “great importance,” but emphasized that relations with Russia were not aimed at any third party. They also sought to downplay the timing of the meeting.

“I would not want to read anything more in that in terms of its significance, except to say that we attach great importance to this annual summit,” Vinay Mohan Kwatra, the foreign secretary of India, said at a news conference on Friday.

The annual summit is an aspect of a longstanding strategic partnership between India and Russia. The two leaders last met in 2021 as part of that partnership, when Mr. Putin visited Delhi. They have met at other events and spoken on the phone multiple times, Indian officials said.

In the nearly two and a half years since launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Putin has attempted to double down on his relationships with global leaders outside the West, as he pursues what he calls a “multipolar” world order free of singular American dominance.

With its vast economic and military resources, China has become the most critical partner in that effort, but Mr. Putin has also touted relations with other nations, including Vietnam, Brazil and India, to prove that Russia will not succumb to the isolation the West is hoping to see.

At an investment forum in Moscow last December, Mr. Putin praised the Indian leader for pursuing an independent foreign policy and refusing to bow to Western pressure. Mr. Modi hasn’t been “scared, intimidated or forced into taking actions or decisions that would go against the national interests of India and the Indian people,” Mr. Putin said.

India’s ties with Moscow and Washington are a balancing act.

For Mr. Modi, the meeting is an opportunity to signal India’s determination to carve its own foreign policy path. India, which needs both the United States and Russia to counter China, is constantly trying to balance its relations between Washington and Moscow. Even as it has bolstered ties with Washington, India has refused to publicly denounce Russia over Ukraine, despite pressure from the United States to do so.

Delhi might be seeking to reinforce its relations with Russia to counter Russia’s growing closeness with China, said Happymon Jacob, an associate professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University and expert on Indian foreign policy. Mr. Putin and President Xi Jinping of China have become increasingly aligned after declaring a “no limits” partnership in 2022. (The two leaders hailed their countries’ ties at a meeting in Kazakhstan last week.)

India probably realizes that the United States is “unlikely to penalize India for continuing its relationship with Russia,” Mr. Jacob said, with China emerging as Washington’s “principal adversary.”

Mr. Modi could also take up the contentious issue of Russia’s recruitment of Indian nationals to fight its war on Ukraine, according to Mr. Kwatra, the Indian foreign secretary. Several dozen Indian citizens were lured to Russia under “false pretenses,” he said, and the government is working to bring them back.

At the same time, India also needs American backing against China’s potential aggressions in its backyard. China and India have had several border clashes over the decades, including in 2022 and 2020 , when 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops were killed. India needs munitions to defend its northern and eastern borders.

Military, economic and energy ties are on the agenda.

Russia is India’s largest supplier of military equipment, but over the years, the share of Russian arms has been declining — partly because that country has older technology. India has sought to diversify its sources of military supplies and pursue defense cooperation agreements, including with the United States. And the United States and India have also said that they would expand cooperation on advanced weaponry, supercomputing and other high-tech fields.

But American officials are concerned about providing equipment and sensitive technology to India if there is a risk that Russia’s military might gain access to it. On a recent visit to New Delhi, Kurt Campbell, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, said the United States wanted a strong technological relationship with India, and has been clear about “which areas are affected by the continuing relationship between India and Russia militarily and technologically.”

India’s defense ties with Russia “may be an irritant for the United States but is insufficient to derail Washington’s military cooperation with India,” said Nandan Unnikrishnan, who oversees the Eurasia studies program at the Observer Research Foundation.

Mr. Unnikrishnan said he did not expect India to announce any new military purchases from Russia during the summit. But he thought that the leaders might announce deals in trade and investment and energy cooperation.

Indian officials have said that the country’s trade imbalance with Russia will be a priority for Mr. Modi. India exports only $4 billion worth of goods to Russia and imports $65 billion, much of it because of its purchases of enormous quantities of oil. India wants to increase its exports to Russia across the board, including agriculture, pharmaceuticals and services.

Paul Sonne contributed to this report from Berlin.

Anupreeta Das is the finance editor of The New York Times, overseeing broad coverage of Wall Street, including banking, investing, markets and consumer finance. She was previously the deputy business editor of The Wall Street Journal. More about Anupreeta Das

Hari Kumar covers India, based out of New Delhi. He has been a journalist for more than two decades. More about Hari Kumar

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Reset Regret: Russian Global Strategy Undermines American Interests

Authors: Ariel Cohen and Stephen Blank

Select a Section 1 /0

According to the Obama Administration, the U.S. is not competing with Russia for global influence. Unfortunately, Moscow has not received this memo. Instead, Russia attempts to extend its influence to constrain U.S. policy. Russian leaders like Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov habitually invoke a “polycentric” or multipolar model of the world, with Russia working with her partners toward a future where U.S. power is so diminished that it cannot act without Moscow’s permission.

Moscow has continuously promoted in word and deed the idea that there is or should be a multipolar world order that constrains U.S. foreign policies. Moscow’s concept of multipolarity entails an uncontested sphere of Russian influence in the CIS and with key actors in critically important regions: Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.  

Anti-American Partnerships

Moscow has formed partnerships with China, Iran, and Venezuela to prevent the U.S. from consolidating a regional order under its auspices. Like the U.S.S.R, its predecessor and inspiration, today’s Russia pursues key allies in the Middle East and Latin America, such as Syria, Iran, and Venezuela, with whom it can jointly frustrate American and Western efforts to consolidate a peaceful regional order. Such partners may resist U.S. policies and actively counter them to distract the U.S., force the U.S. to accommodate Russian interests, or compel an American retreat.

In East Asia, Moscow joins China to advocate “a new Asian security order” based on “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation.” [1] According to the two great powers, all states would respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, not criticize their domestic politics, and support each other on outstanding territorial issues.

To translate: Beijing, Moscow, and their allies will respect Russia’s claims to the Kurile Islands (the Northern Territories) and Georgian territories of Abkhazia/South Ossetia, as well as China’s claims to Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet; China’s territorial claims against Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands; and possibly even China’s claims on the Spratly Islands.

Both countries also support non-alliance principles, equal and transparent security frameworks, and equal and indivisible security. Russia also seeks India’s assent to this formulation and covertly solicits Japan’s endorsement—even as it humiliates Japan over the Kurile Islands, a sure sign of Moscow’s endemic desire to play both sides against the middle and its fundamentally anti-liberal and anti-American orientation. The proposal’s vagueness benefits only Russia and China and squarely denounces the U.S. alliance system in Asia. Ultimately, Russia’s concept of Asian, if not global, multipolarity is self-serving.

Moreover, the joint proposal resembles Russia’s equally self-serving, anti-American, and Anti-NATO proposal for a European Security treaty of 2009–2010. Moscow even applies the same rhetoric to this Asian security proposal that is present in its European Security Treaty draft. At the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue conference in Singapore in 2011, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said:

Russian–Chinese proposals are aimed at helping the countries of the region to realize that security is indivisible and at abandoning attempts to strengthen one’s security at the expense of others. New regional security architecture should be based on the universal principles of international law, non‑aligned approaches, confidence and openness, with due regard to the diversity of the APR and an emerging polycentric balance of forces. [2]

The Unsavory Clients: Tehran, Damascus, Caracas

In addition to diplomatic support for China, Russia has sold Iran, Syria, and Venezuela large amounts of weapons. Despite the laudable cancellation of the S-300 air defense missiles sale to Iran, Moscow still preserves the option of selling other weapons to Tehran. It signed major energy deals with Tehran in 2010 and this summer has advocated easing sanctions on Iran provided it cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency—an institution that has long since demonstrated how easily Iran can deceive it concerning its nuclear program.

Moscow clearly wants to retain ties to Iran, which it regards as the rising great power in the Gulf and Middle East and with whom it wants to collaborate against any Western effort to consolidate a peaceful order. Moscow has sold weapons such as anti-tank missiles to Iran and Syria, and these weapons continue to migrate to Hamas and Hezbollah.

Russia defends Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime despite its bloody repression of its own citizens. This is, among other reasons, because Russia has signed an agreement with Syria to return Soviet naval bases in Latakiye and Tartus to Russian control. Therefore, Russia obstructs U.N. resolutions of censure against Syria. French diplomats who negotiated with Russia believe that Moscow most fears the loss of another ally in the Middle East.

Moscow has also sold billions in weapons to Hugo Chávez’s regime in Venezuela, including fighter jets, tanks, and whole Kalashnikov assault rifle factories. Chávez used his increasing military power to aid the terrorist group FARC directly and run narcotics from West Africa and Latin America into Central and North America.

The notorious arms dealer Viktor Bout, who now awaits trial in a New York federal court, was caught offering to sell weapons to the FARC. Given Bout’s longstanding connections to senior officials of the Russian government, Moscow moved heaven and earth to prevent his extradition from Thailand, where he was arrested, to the U.S. It is quite likely that Bout’s weapons would have been earmarked for the FARC and/or similar narco-terrorists throughout Latin America.

Likewise, Russia has been China’s largest source of foreign weapons since 1990, even though those sales have declined due to Russian fears about Chinese intentions and anger over Chinese piracy and subsequent sale of weapons in competition with Russia in third-party markets. Nevertheless, arms sales and advanced technology transfers from Russia to China still occur.

What Should the U.S. Do?

The optics of Moscow’s ties to anti-American states, which build power to challenge the U.S. regionally and support and control extensive terrorist and intelligence networks, clash dramatically with the optics of the Obama Administration’s “reset.” Tehran, Damascus, and Caracas have an interest in destabilizing their regions and in acquiring advanced conventional—and likely nuclear—weapons. Such proliferation makes for a most problematic multipolarity, which piles up obstacles to U.S. interests and security.

Despite the “reset,” it is in U.S. interests to find out to what degree Moscow orchestrates or participates in joint activities among these problematic states, including arms sales from Iran and Syria to Hamas and Hezbollah. Moscow surely knows of the expansion of the Iranian intelligence, military, economic, and political infrastructure in Iraq, as well as Iran’s ties to Venezuela and those two states’ collaboration in uranium prospecting.

U.S. policymakers should reassess the “reset” and develop regional strategies that counter Russia’s (and China’s) agendas. Such policies should increase pressure on Iran, the most anti-American regional power, and cause the Assad regime in Syria and the Chávez government in Venezuela to stop supporting terrorism.

The Trying Times Ahead

A “reset” policy that ignores Russia’s global efforts to undermine the U.S. recalls the ill-fated détente of the 1970s. It ran aground on Russian expansionism and wars in the Third World, especially Afghanistan. Despite profound changes since then, Russia’s basic anti-American strategic orientation, “reset” rhetoric aside, seems to be the same. In the trying times ahead, when it comes to global challenges, the U.S. should relearn and practice international balance-of-power politics.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. , is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D. , is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War College.

[1] “China, Russia Call for Efforts in Asia–Pacific Security,” China Daily , September 28, 2010, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/28/content_11361116.htm (August 2, 2011).

[2] Speech by Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov to Sixth Plenary Session of the 10th Annual ISSS Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 5, 2011, at http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/speeches/sixth-plenary-session/sergei-ivanov/ (August 2, 2011).

Former Visiting Fellow, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center

Senior Fellow, American Foreign Policy Council

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